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THIs paper has a very limited objective: to set forth, in summary form,
the chief characteristics of the tax systems of the major European
countries. This summary is designed to serve as a background for the
main issue of this Conference—the proper division between direct and
indirect taxes in the American tax system. A factual account is impor-
tant because European tax systems and high rates of European growth
are the arguments the most frequently invoked in favor of revamping
our own tax system. It is my belief that this argument is based upon a
somewhat idealized picture of European tax systems.
I shall also make some comments about the relations of European
tax systems to the successful growth experienced by the continental
countries in the last fifteen years. But let me make clear that the
systematic study of European growth is only in its infancy. To my
knowledge, there is at present no scientific analysis which explains the
favorable growth performance, that is, no set of hypotheses confirmed
by statistical tests absorbing the major economic data. In the absence
of a scientific understanding of European growth, it is impossible to
reach firm conclusions about the effects of European tax systems, for
propositions about the effects of tax systems on the performance of
economies are no more than corollaries to theories explaining the be-
havior of the particular economic systems.
The factual examination will proceed in two stages: First, summary
statistics on direct and indirect taxation are analyzed. The definitional
problems here turn out to be quite serious. Second, a breakdown of the
direct and indirect taxes into the major subtypes of taxes is given and
some comparisons are made. Finally, a view of European growth is
given and conjectures offered on the role of tax policy in the growth
process. An appendix, prepared by Vito Tanzi, summarizes the tax
systems in greater detail and draws further comparisons. To put some
limit to the scope of this paper, the analysis is confined to France,
Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Some
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figures are also given for Japan, another major noncommunist, industrial
country, and the reigning growth champion. While some interest at-
taches to the tax systems of the smaller countries, particularly their
more novel devices, their economic structures so differ from our own
that comparative study is less profitable.
The international comparison of tax systems is indeed a treacherous
task. The actual burden of taxation depends not only on the letter
of the law—which is complicated enough—but also on the spirit of
compliance and enforcement. Every major tax system has its history
of erosion, of preferential treatment, and even of dead letters. A perfect
comparison can only be obtained by living under each of the tax systems
and by dealing with each of the tax collectors. Nevertheless, this paper
is offered in the belief that a comparison of some of the salient charac-
teristics of the nominal tax systems, together with some statistically
derived measures of burden, can be of use.
I. Direct vs. Indirect Taxation:
Some Crude Numerical Arguments
We are all familiar with the following argument: High-growth continen-
tal countries rely far less on direct taxes than on indirect taxes. Their
rapid growth is due to the high rate of saving made possible by this
heavy reliance on indirect taxes. The United States and the United
Kingdom, on the other hand, rely more heavily on direct taxes, save.
less, and grow less.1
Table 1 presents the statistical argument in its crudest form. The
American share of direct income taxes appears to be completely out
of line with every other country, and, in the light of our inferior growth
performance, would lead almost anyone to question whether our tax
system is a sensible one.
However, as Feliner has pointed out,2 there are no universally accepted
definitions of direct and indirect taxes. The much-quoted comparison
given in Table 1 is based on a concept of direct taxes which includes
1Thisargument has been advanced, for example, by Governor Rockefeller in his
address to the NAM Congress on Economic Problems, reported in the New York
Times, December 6, 1962; by Life magazine in an editorial; by Professor Henry C.
Wallich in the New York Times Magazine (September 9, 1962, p. 27) "For Fastest
Growth—What Kind of Tax?"; and by Professor William Feliner, "Problems of
Public Finance During the Sixties," Research Study No. 1 prepared for the Corn-
mission on Money and Credit, published in Fiscal andDebtManagement Policies,
Englewood Cliffs, 1963. Professor Feliner presents figures on various alternative sta-
tistical concepts; the other sources rely on figures of the type presented in Table 1.
2Ibid.,pp. 38—44.
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TABLE1
DIRECT PERSONAL AND CORPORATE INCOME TAX YIELDS AS A PER-
CENTAGE OF TOTAL TAX COLLECTIONS OF CENTRAL
GOVERNMENTS ONLY,SAVINGS RATES, AND GROWTH RATES
Direct Savings as Annual Average
Income Taxes Per Cent ofGNF, Rate of Growth
asPer Centof 1950—60, of Real GNP,
AllTaxes,1960 Average 1950—60
France 33 21. 4.3
Germany 43 25 7.5
Italy 19 23 5.9
Japan 59 26 8.8
UnitedKingdom 51 17 2.6
UnitedStates 80 18 3.3
Source:Based on official statistics of the countries in
Appendix Tables 14—18.
onlypersonal and corporate income taxes, and is thus much narrower
than the more commonly accepted concept. It may be worthwhile dis-
cussing whether the United States has too much income taxation, but
this is a different issue from that of direct vs. indirect taxation under
the usual definitions. A further limitation of the figures is that they
cover central government revenues only, excluding state and local taxes.
After a search of the literature, I find that the definition employed
in the standardized system of national accounts prepared by Professor
Richard Stone for the OEEC and employed by many countries around
the world today has perhaps the most authority. Therea direct taxes on
corporations are defined as "those which are regularly levied on income
or capital (that is, assets minus debts) the assessment of which will
normally take into account the individual circumstances of the tax-
payer....Thetaxes in this flow comprise payables by incorporated
enterprises and co-operatives such as corporate taxes, excess profits
taxes and taxes on undistributed profits or on the capital of corpora-
tions." Direct taxes on households, etc., include "all payables by house-
holds and private nonprofit institutions in respect of direct taxes, as
defined...above,such as income taxes, surtaxes etc. In addition, all
social security contributions are included in this item. All taxes charged
on the possession or use of various durable goods by households are
excluded from this flow and included as indirect taxes..
Thus,according to this definition direct taxes are the sum of income
A Standardized System of National Accounts, OEEC, 1958 ed., pp. 83 and 86
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taxes, estate and gift taxes, personal capital taxes, and all social security
contributions. Table 2 is based on the OEEC definitions. The figures
for the countries other than the United States become substantially
larger than those in Table 1, although they are still far from the extreme
results obtained for the United States.
TABLE2
DIRECT TAXES BY MAJORCATEGORIESAS A
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TAXES,5
CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS ONLY
Capital, Social
Personal Corporate Estate, Security Total
Income Income and Gift Contri— Direct
Taxes Taxes Taxes butions Other Taxes
France 11 7.2 .8 38
5•1b
Germanyc 22 7.7 2.3 32 64
Italy 12 1.1 34 2.3 50
Japan 19 29 .6 19 68
United Kingdom 31 11 3.6 14 60
United States 45 22 1.8 18 87
Source:Based on official statistics of the countries in Appendix Tables 14—18.
alncludes social security contributions.
bversement forfaitaire (payrolltax paid by employer on salaries and wages).
CudLUnder.
Thesefigures are for central governments only. In the case of France,
Italy, and the United Kingdom, central government revenues are a
very large fraction of total government revenues, since local revenues
are rather small. But Germany and the United States have federal
systems of government, and relatively important local revenues. In the
United States, indirect taxes constitute 87 per cent of revenues at the
state and local levels. Therefore, the comparative figures change dras-
tically when all levels of government rather than central governments
alone are considered. Table 3 shows the comparison of direct taxes as a
percentage of total taxes for all levels of government (called "general
government" in the statistical sources), using the official OEEC defini-
tions.
On this basis, which. is the most satisfactory one as long as the argu-
ment is confined to crude statistical comparisons of direct and indirect
taxes, the United States figures are only moderately out of line with
those of other countries. If the proposed tax program is enacted (cutting
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TABLE3
DIRECTTAXES INCLUDING SOCIAL SECURITY
CONTRIBUTIONS AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL







personaland corporate income taxes by 16 per cent4), the U.S. figure
will fall to about 63 per cent, a few points above Germany, about 10
points above the others.
A better measure of the burden of direct taxation can be obtained
by comparing direct-tax revenues with some measure of income, such
as national income or gross national product, rather than with total tax
revenues. Total taxes are a larger fraction of GNP in the European
countries, despite their much smaller outlays for defense, because of a
higher level of welfare expenditures. In the comparison of direct taxes
as a percentage of GNP for all levels of government (Table 4), American
direct taxes including social security contributions are a slightly larger
fraction of GNP than such taxes are in Italy and the United Kingdom,
about the same as in France, and lower than in Germany.5
But these are just numerical debating points and all I have attempted
to do so far is to report the figures as they would appear following the
official OEEC definition. I agree with Fellner that the official definition
of direct taxes is too broad at least for the specific economic analysis at
issue here. The definitions of direct and indirect taxation can be based
on various criteria, which are discussed in Due's introduction to this
volume and in some of the papers. The distinction can be made on such
grounds as tax-consciousness, shiftability, personal assessment as op-
posed to levies on transactions, and income as opposed to expenditures.
For the purposes of this paper, I take the issue to be the following: do
direct taxes, by being a payment to the government wholly related to
individual income or wealth, discourage private effort, saving, and
investment? The requisite definition must be partly based on tax-
consciousness and partly on the initial impact falling on income rather
than consumption.
Reference to tax reduction proposals are to those which were enacted in March
1964.
If social security contributions are excluded, the U.S. figure becomes the highest,
but after the tax cut would differ little from Germany and the United Kingdom
221EUROPEAN AND U.S. TAX STRUCTURES
TABLE
L
DIRECTTAXES, EXCLUDING AND INCLUDING SOCIAL
SECURITYCONTRIBUTIONS,AS A PERCENTAGE
OF GNPAND TOTAL TAXESAS A PERCENTAGEOF GNP,
ALL LEVELSOF GOVER*€NT, 1961
Direct Taxes as Per Cent of GNP
Excluding Including
TotalTaxes Social Social
as PerCent . Security Security
ofGNP Contributions Contributions
France 35 6 18
Germany 35 11 21
Italy 28 6 14
UnitedKingdom 29 11 15
UnitedStates 28 14 18
U.S. (with tax cut) 26 12 16
Source:UN Yearbook of National Accounts, and OEEC statistics,
1962.
Ibelieve that the following taxes should be properly included as direct
according to this approach: all income taxes, estate and gift taxes,
and net worth taxes, as well, as those social security contributions
which are paid by the employee out of his income and based on the
amount of that income. This definition differs from the official OEEC
definition by excluding employer contributions to social security. I be-
lieve that these should be considered indirect taxes because they are
costs of carrying on business like any other tax on the use of a factor
of production; even if they are shifted to the employee, he will not
recognize them nor view them as a direct payment out of his income.
Employee contributions to social security are included as a direct tax,
however, since they are direct payments by individuals based on their
income. Under modern withholding systems, as in the United States,
the money withheld for social security from the employee's pay envelope
is a direct reduction of his income, in the same fashion as a personal
income tax. Presumably it has the same effect on willingness to work
and to save.6
Table 5 presents comparative figures for the five countries for direct
taxes according to this definition, expressed both as a percentage of
total government revenue and as a percentage of GNP. In these figures,
which I shall take as definitive, the United States has the highest burden
6Butemployee social security contributions do have the desirable properties of
a lump-sum tax once income is beyond the level at which the contribution ceiling
applies. The marginal rate then becomes zero.
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TABLE5
DIRECTTAXES, INCLUDING ONLY EMh?LOYEE CONTRIBUTIONS TO
SOCIAL SECURITY, AS A PERCENTAGE OF GNP ANDASA


















(as per cent of total taxes)
France 11 7 9 27 9
Germany 22 9 13 44 15
















bThe Cost of Social Security, ILO, 1961.
ofCurrent Business, July 1962.
ofdirect taxation in relation to GNP, slightly greater than Germany,
somewhat greater than the United Kingdom, much greater than France
or Italy. The tax cut would bring the U.S. figures to about the level
of Germany and the United Kingdom.
II. Corn of Specific Taxes
The aggregate statistics are of some significance as measures of the
tax burden. However, the total revenue figures depend upon the nominal
rate structure; the absolute levels of income, in the case of progressive
income taxes; the extent of loopholes, tax avoidance, and evasion; the
relative size of the agricultural sector; and the importance of unincor-
porated business.
To dig a little deeper into the problem, I now present some com-
parisons for each of the major direct and indirect taxes for the five
countries.
A. DIRECT TAXES
1. Personal Income Taxes
All the five countries have progressive income taxes. Comparison is
difficult because the taxes differ not only in rates, but also in other
aspects of their structure, such as the treatment of the family, of capital
gains, and of income from different sources. Thus, Italy has a schedular
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income tax in addition to a global tax; the United Kingdom is particu-
larly unfavorable in its tax treatment of marriage, while France has a
system of income splitting even more elaborate than the United States
and Germany. The Appendix contains a summary of the structural
features of the income taxes. Here I shall only draw some numerical
comparisons, which, however, suffice to bring out the relative income
tax burdens.
Table 6 gives some characteristics of the rate structures. It shows,
TABLE£
CHARACTERISTICS OF
UPPERANDLOWERLEVELS OF PERSONALINCOME TAX
STRUCTURES, FOR MARRIED COUPLES Will-I TWO
CHILDREN, CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS,a 1961






































UnitedStates 2,400 20 4,000 91,0 400,000
official exchange rates as of 1963.




eUK., after 1963 changes.
fora married taxpayer with two young children, the total exemptions,
the lowest rate of tax, the maximum marginal rate, and the income
level at which this latter rate begins to apply. It can be seen that all
of the European countries have lower exemptions. France and Italy
have very much lower exemptions, but their first bracket rates are also
lower. Thus, they have less discontinuity between the exemption and
the first taxable bracket than the United States. At the other end of the
income scale, the maximum marginal rate of tax has been highest in
the United States, substantially higher than in the continental countries.
After the tax cut, the U.S. rate will still be higher, but the differential
will be very much reduced. On the other hand, the maximum rate be-
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comes applicable at lower income levels in most of the continental
countries.
A systematic comparison of the extent of progression among coun-
tries requires that a specific set of circumstances be postulated for a
family and their hypothetical tax be computed at different income levels.
Such an exercise was conducted by L. Needleman of the National Insti-
tute of Economic and Social Research. Table 7 summarizes his findings.
TABLE7
PERCENTAGE OF GROSS INCOt€ PAID IN TAX AND NET































5,000 17,050 13 25 23 36 19 16
10,000 34,100 23 33 30 52 29 24
50,000 170,500 40 48 40 81 62 53
Source:L. Needleman, "International Comparisons of the burden of Taxation,"
National Institute Economic Review, March 1961.Figures for France and Italy
prepared by Needleman for E. Kirschen and others, Economic Policy in Our Time.
aNet social security contributions consist of employee's contribution minus
faintly allowances.
bThestandard family consists of a man all of whose income is salary and who
is not a director of a company nor employed in government service, a dependent wife,
both adults being under 50 years old, and two children between the ages of 6 and 10.
CAtcost—of—livingexchange rates.
du.S.Treasury estimate of effect of tax cut. Increase in lowest bracket is
due to rise of social security contributions.
eLess than 0.5per cent.
Lower-incomegroups appear to be taxed most heavily in Germany and
the U.S.; this is due to the net social security contributions, that is,
the receipt of family allowances in the other countries. The burden of
taxation on middle- and upper-income groups is highest in the Tjnited
Kingdom.7 The burden in the United States is most nearly comparable
to that in Germany, somewhat lower in the lower- and middle-income
Ihave not incorporated the effects of the tax reduction in the U.K. in 1963
into the figures. However, the cut was largely a flat amount for all income levels,
so that it would not reduce the middle- and upper-income tax rates significantly,
hut would affect the rates at the bottom.
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brackets, somewhat higher in the high brackets; after the U.S. tax cut,
most of the present differential in the tax brackets will be removed. The
income tax burden in France and Italy is lower than in the other coun-
tries.
The comparison by Needleman utilizes the nominal tax rates. This
method makes no allowance for avoidance and evasion or peculiarities
of the systems. The tax treatment of capital gains is probably the most
important peculiarity to be considered. We know that in the United
States the average effective tax rates computed on income inclusive of
capital gains are substantially lower than the nominal rates. In fact,
they do not go over 40 per cent for any income class. I am not able to
estimate the significance of capital gains for the European rich. However,
the tax treatment is even more favorable. Capital gains are not taxed
at all unless they originate from a personal business. The definition of
capital gains excludes some of the fringe areas allowed in the United
States, but this is a minor factor compared to the absence of any tax
on the capital gains on securities and other assets.
No reliable information is available on the extent of avoidance and
evasion, It is generally believed that there is extensive evasion in
countries with a Latin tradition such as France and Italy. Some crude
idea of the actual burden of income taxes can be obtained from a com-
parison of the personal income tax payments in relation to national
income (see Table 8). The figures imply that there are indeed deviations
between the nominal rate structures and the tax revenues collected,
but the deviations are not as large as is often suggested. France and
Italy collect between 4 and 5 per cent of national income as tax; Ger-
many and the United Kingdom, with substantially higher rate struc-
tures, between 8 and 10 per cent. The U.S. figure, which presently is
above the rest, will fall to about 9 per cent when the tax cut is enacted.
One would expect that the U.S. income tax would take a larger frac-
tion of income because of the substantially higher level of per capita
income. In fact, it is surprising that the differential between the U.S.
figure and the others is so small. Given the extent of progression in the
tax, a decline of U.S. per capita income to the European levels should
result in a far more than proportionate decline in tax collections. If
our personal income tax has an income elasticity of 1.5 to 2.0, then a
30 per cent reduction of per capita income would reduce the ratio of tax
to income from 10 per cent to the range of 6 to 8 per cent.
The various comparisons of personal income taxes suggest that Ger-
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TABLE8
RATIO OFPERSONALDIRECTTAXES TONATIONAL












Source:Based on official statistics of
countries in Appendix Tables 1418.
aFdl and Lander.
bitaiy also hassome significant local
income taxes.
CThe ratio is about 9 per cent after the
1963 reduction in the U.K.
the U.S., state and local income taxes
represent another 0.6 per cent of national
income.
manyand the United States have rather similar systems, that the
United Kingdom has a system which is more progressive, with lower
burdens at the bottom but higher burdens in the middle and upper
brackets, and that France and Italy have considerably lighter burdens
at the top' and bottom, but rather similar burdens to those of the U.S.
and Germany in a wide middle range.
2. ,Succe.ssion, Gift, and Personal Capital Taxes
The structures of succession and gift taxes vary substantially among
the five countries. On the continent, inheritance taxes prevail, with the
rates dependent upon the degree of relationship between the deceased
and the beneficiary. The United Kingdom and the United States have
estate taxes.
Nortcliffe has computed the hypothetical tax payable on an estate
of £1,000,000, that is, $2,800,000 (see Table 9). Judged by these nominal
rates, the succession taxes are very heavy in Italy and the U.K., rela-
tively light in the other three countries. However, avoidance of succes-
sion duties is such a common practice that one cannot take the nominal
rates as indicative of burdens. Actual revenues are probably a better
measure. Table 10 shows the ratios of succession and gift taxes to total
taxes and to GNP. Here it can be seen that the United Kingdom has
much the heaviest such taxes, that France and Italy and the United
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TABLE9







Source:E. B. Nortcliffe, Common Market Fiscal
Systems, London, 1961, p. 87.
a
The table is calculated on the assumption that
the property is worth million ($2,800,000), 40 per
cent of which is passed to the widow, 15 per cent to
each of three sons and daughters, and 5 per cent each
to three brothers and sisters.(U.S.estimateby the author.)
Stateshave comparable payments, and Germany has a much lighter
burden.8
Germany's very light succession duties are offset by her personal net
worth tax (Vermogensteuer).This tax is .75 to 1 per cent of the net worth
TABLE10
SUCCESSION AND GIFT TAXES AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL








United Kingdom 4.4 1.28
United States 1.5 0.42
Source:Based on official statistics of countries in Appendix
Tables 14—18.
ofan individual or a corporation. While assessed rather lightly on real
property, it is a significant tax on intangible property, yielding a total
revenue equal to 1.93 per cent of all government revenues. There is
presently some agitation to increase the rate significantly.
8Gifttaxes are consistent with the estate taxes, with either the same or a some-
what lower rate schedule.
228EUROPEAN AND U.S. TAX STRUCTURES
This group of taxes, which can be assumed to fall on personal capital,
represents a moderate and similar burden in all countries, except in
the United Kingdom where it plays a larger role.
3. Corporation Income Taxes
The United States relies more heavily on the corporation income tax
than the major European countries. Table 11 shows the relation of the
TABLE11
CORPORATEINCONE TAXES AS A PERCENTAGE OF GNP AND OF
TOTAL TAXES, 1961
CentralGovernment All LevelsofGovernment
AsPer CentofAsPer Cent of AsPer CentofAsPer Cent of
GNP Total Taxes GNP Total Taxes
France 2.3 8.5 2.3 6.7
Germany 1.1 4.0 3.2 9.0
Italy n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Japan 3.8 29.4 n.a. n.a.
UnitedKingdom 3.1 12.7 3.1 10.6
UnitedStates 4.0 21.6 4.2 16.5
Source;Based on official statistics of countries in Appendix Tables 14—18, and
CEEC statistics.
corporationincome taxes of the central government and all levels of
government to GNP and to total taxes.
The basic nominal rate in the United States is not much higher than
elsewhere. But the structures of the taxes differ, particularly in the
treatment of distributed profits. The United Kingdom has traditionally
followed a policy of integrated treatment of personal and corporate
income taxation, and the basic rate of 38.75 per cent is considered with-
holding at the source on personal tax. There is also a profits tax of 15
per cent, making the tax on undistributed profits equal to 53.75 per
cent and that on distributed profits only 15 per cent. Germany, in order
to foster the development of a capital market rather than have com-
panies rely exclusively on internal financing, has a tax rate on undis-
tributed profits of 51 per cent, but on distributed profits of only 15 per
cent. France, like the United States, does not distinguish between dis-
tributed and undistributed profits and taxes them at 50 per cent. Italy
applies its schedular income tax system to corporations as well as indi-
viduals, with a maximum rate of 31.23 per cent. In addition, Italy has a
corporation tax of 15 per cent on profits exceeding 6 per cent of net
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worth plus a property tax of .75 per cent on net worth. These two taxes
together normally produce a total tax of about 45 per cent on profits;
however, there is some relief on personal taxation because none of the
schedular income taxes applies to the dividend income, which is subject
only to the global tax.
Depreciation is now on a liberal basis in all the countries. In France,
the declining-balance method was approved in 1959, as a replacement
for numerous special provisions including escalation for inflation;9 it
will be compulsory after 1964. In Germany, the declining-balance
method is a standard method. In Italy, the straight-line method is still
standard but the permissible rates are fairly liberal; investment in the
south of the country and in new industries benefits from special treat-
ment. The United Kingdom still does not permit universal use of the
declining-balance method, particularly for buildings, but liberal use has
been made of investment allowances, which grant additional deprecia-
tion deductions in the early years. The United States not only permits
the use of the declining-balance and sum-of-the-year-digit methods but
has also instituted an investment credit of 7 per éent on equipment, and
has shortened the periods over which particular assets may be fully de-
preciated. Given the extent of administrative discretion in the setting of
depreciation allowances, it is difficult to compare the actual practices
of the various countries. However, after the several liberalizing depre-
ciation moves in the U.S., it would be hard to argue that our practice
is significantly tougher than elsewhere.
Given the rather general similarities of nominal rates and practices,
why does the American corporation income tax represent a• higher per-.
centage of GNP than in the other countries? The primary reason lies
in the greater significance of the corporate sector in the economy. In
the U.S., 65 per cent of national income originates in the corporate
sector; in the European countries the figure is one-half or less. The
remaining differences are due to: (1) the lower rates on distributed
profits, i.e., in Germany, the United Kingdom; (2) a lower professional
standard of accounting; (3) time lags in the collection of taxes in an
expanding economy (a time lag of two years is not unusual in Europe,
compared to a present lag of six months in the United States); and (4)
administrative interpretations which may be more favorable in some
European countries than here.
See Martin Norr, "Depreciation Reform in France," in Taxes—The Tax Maga-
zine, May 1961, pp. 391—401, for a description of the important and instructive
changes that were made in this area in France.
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4. Other Direct Taxes on Business Income
This discussion of direct taxation would not be complete without
mentioning other significant direct taxes on business. Particularly in
Germany, the direct burden on business includes other taxes as well as
the income tax. The property tax (Vermogensteuer) of 1 per cent of net
worth adds to the burden. Even more important, the trade tax (Gewer-
best euer), which is imposed by municipalities and constitutes their main
source of revenue, has a total yield equal to the corporation tax, though
part of this is derived from unincorporated business. It provides a 15
per cent tax on profits, a 0.6 per cent tax on net worth, and a 1 to 2
per cent tax on wages paid.'°
TABLE12
DIRECTCORPORATION TAXES ON PROFITS AND PROPERTY




France 50 50 50
Germany 70 65 53
Italy 45 45 45
UnitedKingdom 54 45 24
UnitedStates 55 55 55
Source:R. Mees and Zoonen, Company Taxation
in Europe, 1962, P. 7, U.S. estimate made
by the author.
a
The table makes no allowance for value—added
taxes which are classified in the category.
They viii be discussed at greater length below.But
let me point out here that the French value—added
tax of 20 per cent applies to all of the value—added,
including corporate profits.Thus the tax has some
of the characteristics of a direct tax of 20 per cent
on all profits.
Awell-known study by the International Bureau of Fiscal Documen-
tation in Amsterdam presents comparative figures of direct-tax burdens
on profits and property of corporations for the European countries,
considering both income and other direct taxes (see Table This
10Minordirect taxes on business can also be found in France and Italy.
Alsosee the paper by Musgrave and Richnian iii this volume for a more recent
comparison.
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table shows that the burden is heaviest in Western Germany, particu-
larly if a substantial portion of profits are retained in the business.
France, Italy, and the United Kingdom all have burdens of about 50
per cent. Figures for the United States are bit higher than for the latter
group when state taxes of about 3 per cent are included. With the tax
cut, the U.S. figures would be about the same as in France, Italy, and the
United Kingdom.
5. Contributions for Social Security
Contributions for social security are much larger in Europe than in
the United States.'2 The expenditures are substantially higher because
all the European countries have programs of health insurance, and the
benefit levels of the pension and unemployment programs represent
larger fractions of normal wage income than in the United States.
France and Italy also have extensive programs of family allowances.
Table 13 shows the ratios of social security expenditures to national
TABLE13




as Per Cent of
Sourcesof Financing
Insured
National Income Persons EmployersGovernment OtherTotal
France 16.2 19.2 68.9 7.1 4.8 100
Germany 17.0 37.3 40.9 17.9 3.9 100
Italy 14.9 15.2 72.4 7.1 5.3 100
UnitedKingdom 9.6 27.0 21.0 51.5 0.5 100
UnitedStates 5.3 41.0 45.0 14.0 — 100
Source:Reid, The Banker, June 1963, p. 413.U. S. figures computed by the
author.For the U.S.,publicassistance was considered part of social security in
order to make the figures more comparable with the European.The part of the
expenditures financed by the government represents the public assistance payments.
income, as well as the sources offinancing. It can be seen that U.S.
expenditures are significantly less than those on the Continent and
somewhat less than in Britain. Our method of financing is similar to
Germany's. We tax employers less and employees more than do France
and Italy. In the United Kingdom a much larger fraction of the financing
comes from general revenues.
12Fora brief survey, see G. L. Reid, "Social Security in Britain and the Six,"
The Banker, June 1963, pp. 409—416.
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The financing of social security in Germany and the United States is
probably more favorable to economic growth than in the other countries.
In Italy and France, the high charges on the employer raise the cost
of doing business, at least to the extent that the charges are not shifted
into higher prices or lower wages. In the United Kingdom, the large
share financed, out of general revenues is one of the causes for the high
level of direct taxation.
Given both the lower level of U.S. expenditures and the financing
method, one must conclude that this is one area in which public finance is
more favorable to the development of the private sector and to economic
growth in the United States than in the other countries.
B. INDIRECT TAXATION
Taxes other than those classified as direct are known as indirect taxes.
Thus, this is a catch-all category of taxes, largely but not wholly levied
on transactions; an exception is the property tax in the U.S. I shall
classify indirect taxes into two categories: general indirect taxes which
are applied across the board, such as value-added taxes, turnover taxes,
and purchase taxes of broad scope; and selective indirect taxes, including
the excises on individual commodities, customs duties, and stamp and
registration taxes. Table 14 summarizes indirect taxes for the central
governments.
Unfortunately, a similar table cannot be prepared for all levels of
government because rates differ among states and localities. The sig-
nificance of indirect taxes for local governments can be seen in part
from the aggregate figures of Tables 2 and 3; while they play a larger
role outside the central government than within it in all countries
except Italy, the difference is greatest for the United States, where
state and local governments collect substantial revenues and rely almost
wholly on indirect taxes. The U.S. has particularly heavy local taxation
of real property. U.S. property taxes in 1960 were 11 per cent of total
government revenue; the figure for local rates in England is about 9
per cent; fOr the property tax in Germany (Grundsteuer) about 3 per
cent; in Italy (imposta sui terreni) about 0.3 per cent; while in France
the impôt foncier yields 2 to 3 per cent.'3
1. General Indirect Taxes
The value-added tax adopted in France as a substitute for turnover
taxation is currently receiving the most attention as a potential source
Systèmes Fiscaux des Pays Membres de la Communauté Econornique Euro-





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.EUROPEAN AND U.S. TAX STRUCTURES
of new revenue. The tax is levied normally at a rate of 20 per cent on the
value of total sales including the tax element (25 per cent on luxury
articles, 10 per cent on many raw materials, 6 per cent on some food-
stuffs, 12 per cent on construction, 5 to 12.5 per cent on various serv-
ices, and no tax on exports), but credit is given for value-added tax
paid on purchased inputs. The tax is levied at the production and whole-
sale levels. Because of the current interest in this tax, I shall return
to it in the closing section of this paper.
Turnover taxes are still important in Germany (at a rate of 4 per
cent) and in Italy (3.3 per cent). These are pyramiding sales taxes which
are generally acknowledged to have produced excessive vertical integra-
tion of industry.
The United Kingdom still applies purchase tax to a broad range of
goods, ranging from 5 per cent (e.g., on shoes, furniture, some clothing)
to 50 per cent (e.g., on autos, television sets, toiletries). The tax has
been used to restrain consumption. Although here classified as a general
indirect tax, it could be regarded as a system of selective excise taxes.
2. Selective Indirect Taxes
All countries obtain considerable revenue by placing heavy taxes on
certain commodities. While tobacco, alcohol, and gasoline are the most
commonly chosen items, there is no uniformity of pattern. Stamp and
registration taxes are much in use in France and Italy. Tobacco is taxed
particularly heavily in the United Kingdom and Italy; in France it is a
profitable state monopoly. The United States singles out liquor, while
gasoline is taxed very heavily in France, Italy, and the United Kingdom.
The United Kingdom is exceptionally hard on beer, Germany and Italy
on coffee. No doubt these patterns are the results of national cultures
rather than of economic policy.
III. Tax Policg andMechanismsof European Growth
It is impossible to reach meaningful conclusions about the role of tax
systems in European growth without having a coherent view of the
growth process itself.
In this discussion I proceed in three stages: first, I preseiit a statis-
tical overview of the growth process. Second, I present some qualitative
theories which can account for the movement in the aggregate figures.
Finally, I draw some very limited conclusions from the analysis about
the role of tax policy.
Tax policy and tax systems can affect the growth process in at least
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five ways. First, the automatic response of revenues to economic growth,
together with expenditure trends, will help determine the level of aggre-
gate demand. Second, the level of surplus or deficit of the budget'4 will
add or subtract from the supply of saving. Third, the general character
of the tax system will influence the total rate of saving and investment.
Fourth, specific structural characteristics will influence both total sav-
ings and investment and the sectoral distribution of investment. Finally,
specific policy measures—that is, acts of policy to change the tax rates
or the nature of the taxes themselves—can influence growth, either by
design or by accident.'5 It would be far beyond the scope of this paper
to review systematically each of the five tax systems with respect to each
of these five matters, and hence I only present some key points.
The role of tax policy must also be evaluated within the perspective
of total economic policy. One can ask: of all the measures taken to pro-
mote the objective of economic growth, what role was played by tax
measures? Elsewhere'6 I have participated in a detailed comparative
study of the use of all instruments of economic policy. For an account of
specific measures for each family of instruments (public finance, money
and credit, direct controls, changes in the institutional framework, and
exchange rates), I refer the reader to that study.
A. STATISTICAL PERSPECTIVES ON GROWTH
Table 15, taken from a paper by Stanley H. Cohn,'7 shows the average
annual rates of growth of GNP for the five countries studied in this
paper, plus the USSR and Japan. The paper decomposes the GNP
growth into growth of employment and of productivity, revealing that
productivity growth was the more important factor in all cases. The
table also presents the ratio of nonresidential investment to GNP. It
can be seen that there is a very close association between the rate of
advance of productivity and the proportion of total output which each
country devotes to nonresidential investment. A high rate of growth
SeeAndrew H. Gantt, "Central Governments: Cash Deficits and Surpluses,"
Review of Economics and Statistics, February 1963, Pp.34—46, fora systematic com-
parison of this matter.
Afull account of such measures can be found in the NBER-Brookings Confer-
ence volume, Tax Policies and Economic Growth in Selected Foreign Countries (in
press).
E.Kirschen, J. Benard, H. Besters, F. Blackaby, 0. Eckstein, J. Faaland,
F. Hartog, L. Morrissens, and E. Tosco, Economic Policy in Our Time, 3 vols.,
Amsterdam, 1963 and 1964.
17StanleyH. Cohn, "Gross National Product in the Soviet Union: Comparative
Growth Rates," in Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power, Joint Economic Committee,
Washington, 1961, pp. 68—89.














France 4.3 0.4 3.9 90 15.9
Germany 7.5 2.2 5.2 73 19.6
Italy 5.9 1.6 4.3 78 17.2
UnitedKingdom 2.6 0.6 2.0 77 13.4
Japan 8.8 1.9 6.7 80 23.3
USSR 6.8 1.9 4.7 74 17.7
UnitedStates 3.3 1.2 2.1 66 1.2.9
Source:Cohnin Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power.
overa considerable interval is, with little doubt, always associated with
a high rate of nonresidential investment.
The structure of investment also plays a strategic role. Table 16 shows
the distribution of investment by type. The United States spends less
on equipment and comparable amounts on construction relative to the
high-growth countries.
TABLE16
ELEMENTSOF INVESTMENT AS APERCENTAGE OF GNP
IN SEVENMAJORCOUNTRIES,1950—60












France 4.8 6.2 9.6 20.6
Germany 5.8 6.4 13.2 25.4
Italy 7.1 10.1 22.9
Unitedkingdom 3.3 4.7 8.7 16.8
Japan • 2.4 23.2 25.6
USSR 4.0 10.2 7.5 23.9
UnitedStates 4.8 6.6 6.3 17.7
Source:Cohn tn Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power.
The distribution of investment among sectors is also revealing (see
Table17). The United States invests relatively more heavily in housing,
trade, education, health, military construction, and services, and rela-
tively less in the strategic growth sectors of manufacturing, mining,
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TABLE17
SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF CAPITAL INVESTMENT
IN FIVE LARGECOUNTRIES,1959










Germany 8.3 27.6 5.4 16.1 23.1 19.5
Italy 11.9 22.7 6.4 15.0 28.6 15.4
UnitedKingdom 4.0 27.3 11.7 13.7 17.8 25.3
USSR 14.1 35.0 4.1 8.5 22.6 15.8
UnitedStates 4.7 16.2 7.1 7.0 30.0 35.0
Source:Cohnin Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power.
utilities,and transportation. Suburban shopping centers do not have
the same growth impact, dollar for dollar, as industrial investment,
yet these are the outlets in which substantial capital is absorbed in the
U.S.
In seeking the causes of the rapid European growth of the postwar
period, the most obvious, and perhaps the most important, point is the
simple fact that growth was retarded in the prior period. Angus Mad-
dison has prepared comparisons of long-term rates of increase of GNP,
which are summarized in Table 18.
It can be seen that the longer-term figures are relatively more uniform.
TABLE18
RATES OF GROWTH OF GNP,SELECTEDINTERVALS
(per cent)
Germany Italy United Kingdom United States
1.870—1913 3.1 1.4 2.3 3.7
1913—57 2.0 2.0 1.6 2.9
1913—29 0.5 1.8 1.3 2.8
1929—38 2.5 1.6 2.2 —0.4
1938—51 0.9 1.0 1.2 5.3
1951—57 7.5 5.4 2.5 3.0
Source:Angus Maddison, "Economic Growth in Western Europe,
Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, 1959, Pp. 3—46.U.S.
figures from 3. Kendrick, Productivity Trends in the United States, Princeton
for NBER, 1961, p. 332; figures are for GNP per unit of labor input.
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The recent very high rates for Germany and Italy followed an interval
of virtually no growth, while the modest growth in the United States
succeeded the preceding rapid expansion. Presumably this catching-up
process consisted largely of the introduction of existing technology, the
completion of the repair of war damage, and a resumption of the move-
ment of the labor force from agriculture to industry.
But neither crude quantitative relationships between capital and out-
put growth nor the acknowledgment of a catching-up process constitute
sufficiently fine theories to permit an analysis of the impact of taxation.
I now turn to a more specific view of the changes in economic structure
and of the growth process of each of the countries. I believe that these
qualitative accounts explain, at least as a first approximation, their
happy economic experiences.
B. ANALYSES OF INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES
1. Italy18
The postwar period has seen Italy evolve from a country on the edge
of modern industrialism, poor in raw materials and with a market too
small to permit efficient production, into a modern economy using the
latest technology. At least this is true of the north of Italy, the southern
part of the country having been relatively little touched so far.
There has been a considerable growth of certain heavy industries,
chemicals, metal manufacture including steel, and automobiles. These
industries enjoyed a real rate of growth of 10 to 15 per cent a year.
Partly in response to the industrial growth and the resultant growth
of incomes, a great construction boom took place and the production
of electricity increased at a very high rate. These sectors absorbed a
great deal of capital as modern industries were established.
The growth of the industrial sectors was made possible by a very
large expansion of exports, a tripling from 1950 to 1959. Italian chemi-
cals, automobiles, and appliances became competitive in markets in
Germany and France, and even in the United States. Italian prices in
these sectors were stable or falling as unit wage costs remained steady
because of the enormous productivity gains. Thus, a circular growth
process took place, under which costs were kept low by high productivity
gains made possible by a great expansion of exports.
Other factors also had a favorable influence. The formation of the
18Afuller account of postwar Italian growth can be found in Vera Lutz, Italy,
A Study in Economic Development, London, 1962, Chapter 4.
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European Coal and Steel Community helped the steel industry to attain
successful development. The income from tourism not oniy strengthened
the balance of payments but added to domestic purchasing power. Wage
increases were kept in check by the large influx of labor from rural
areas and particularly from the south. Economies of scale were probably
realized in other sectors as well.
The process of growth with stable export prices continued until 1962,
at which time it appeared to be in some danger. Wholesale prices which
had been stable for eleven years started rising, and in the first quarter
of 1963 were 5 per cent above the levels of a year earlier. The rate of
wage increases became somewhat greater than before, while the rate
of increase of industrial production slowed from the 11 per cent which
prevailed from 1950 to 1961 to 5 per cent. It remains to be seen whether
this is only a pause or a tapering off of the process.
The most important growth measures were taken on the expenditure
side: direct public investments, the use of government capital in semi-
public enterprises, and the creation of public credit institutions to lend
capital to private enterprises. The level of aggregate demand was kept
high, rising as fast as production potential.
As for the role of the tax system, the tax treatment of depreciation
was liberalized, and, more generally, a relatively light burden of direct
taxation helped to facilitate the accumulation of the capital that was
necessary for the growth of the strategic sectors. If there had been an
acute capital shortage, the growth process would have been slowed and
might even have stopped.
The tax system did not create the growth process: it was a permissive
factor.'9 The process itself is attributable to the historical situation,
plus the boost that was given to Italian exports by the devaluation of
1949.20
2. France2'
The role of taxation in French growth must be reviewed within the
context of total French economic policy. On the one hand, the govern-
ment permitted a state of general excess demand to continue for most
Somespecific tax measures were taken to give favorable treatment to invest-
ment in the south. Also, during the earlier postwar period when inflation was sub-
stantial, some revaluation of assets was allowed for purposes of income taxation.
20Thetax system was also helpful in some minor ways. The Italian government
did not hesitate to use highly selective methods to help exports and discourage
imports on occasions.
21Foran account of French economic policy since World War II, see John Sheahan,
Promotion and Control of Industry in Postwar France, Cambridge, Mass., 1963.
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of the period, resulting in substantial inflation—more inflation than in
most other European countries or the United States.22 On the other
hand, the government pursued policies of intervention that would not
be acceptable in most other capitalist countries, among which were the
following:
1. Indicative planning, which during the first plan led to a partly
forced rationalization of steel and other basic industries; in later plans
it consisted of coordination of investment, plus a raising of sights for
business investment plans.
2. Policies which Sheahan has called selective promotion and protec-
tion. These include public credit, special depreciation allowances for
certain industries such as steel and export producers, favored treatment
under the value-added tax, preference on government orders, and fa-
vored access to imports of equipment ordinarily restricted.23 It also
means protection from foreign competition in some cases, most impor-
tantly for industrial equipment industries. In recent years, capital has
become more readily available from private sources and policies of
protection have been circumscribed by the integration with the Common
Market, making these policies less important.
3. Selective price controls. Until 1958, the French government main-
tained a system of price controls for basic industries, including alumi-
num, steel, automobiles, etc. This policy helped to keep French exports
competitive, despite a rather general inflationary process at home. (Some
price control measures were resumed in 1963.)
Two other policies deserve mention. At the time that price controls
were removed, the franc was devalued, first in a selective way, then
across the board in 1958. This devaluation, just at the moment when
industrial prices all over the world stabilized, put French exports into a
favorable position and has kept them there. France, more than the
other European countries, now finds itself with a continued strong bal-
ance of payments and good export growth. As Sheahan points out,
France learned her lesson in the interwar period of avoiding false, re-
strictive fiscal and monetary policies and the wrong exchange rate.
The other policy change to which particular interest attaches for this
Conference is the adoption of the now famous value-added tax. This tax
replaced a pyramided turnover tax, eliminating the previous pressure
for excessive vertical integration. By raising the cost of labor, it pro-
22 But it must be kept in mind that France fought two wars in the 1950's, the war
in Indo-China and the war in Algeria, which necessitated diversion of substantial
resources to military purposes.
23 Sheahan, Promotion andControl,pp. 27—28.
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vided an incentive for the introduction of labor-saving machinery. The
adoption of the value-added tax also opened up the possibility of its
selective use: the tax has been remitted on export industries and has
been deliberately used to influence industry investment choices.
Can the success of French postwar growth be attributed to the policies
of intervention? It must be acknowledged that France shares the favor-
able historical situation with the other continental countries, and there
was some catching up to do. Consumer incomes passed through the
levels at which the demand for durables becomes particularly great,
stimulating, in turn, the production of all heavy industry, leading to
large productivity gains from economies of scale and the introduction
of modern technology. The expansion of heavy industry, including the
associated investment in electricity and other basic utilities, makes a
high rate of capital formation necessary and possible.
Nevertheless, it would be false to argue that the policy of intervention
had no effect. Sheahan's book makes it clear that French intervention is
more than just exhortation; the government has the power and the
desire to change private decisions about investment, about prices, and
about plant location. One could argue that French growth would have
been just as high without intervention. But it would have been a dif-
ferent growth of the economic structure; the rationalization of the steel
industry, the investment and product innovation in the automobile
industry made by the state-owned Renault Company, and numerous
other large and small changes were the results of government action and
would not have occurred otherwise. Thus, it is a synthetic question to
ask what the growth of the French economy would have been in the
absence of government intervention. Sheahan concludes that postwar•
French intervention represented a change in government policy. In his
brilliant conclusion he writes:
In the interwar period, French governments sided with the forces of
conservation against change, impeding an initially low level of private
initiative, whether the particular governments were conservative in con-
ventional political terminology or whether they were not. The basis of
the transformation in postwar France was that important agencies of gov-
ernment, as distinct from that mythical entity, "the government," reversed
alliances. They reached into the economy to side with particular business
forces favorable to progress. In the first years they provided direct initia-
tive through new managements in some of the previously weak or par-
ticularly crucial basic industries. They stimulated private initiative through
plans which could, if stripped of their obsession with concentration, raise
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the level of performance without destroying competition in any society.
They did not determine the growth rate, they merely improved it.
It is as much a mistake in France as in the United States to consider
issues of alternative market organization primarily in terms of a conflict
between government intervention and private business choice. The true
opposition is between the complex of forces favorable to initiative and
progress, which may come from either government or private enterprise,
and the obstacles to progress which may equally well come from either
side. No nation is or ever will be free of the latter, because the impediments
to economic progress are rooted in the search for reduction of uncertainty
and in the impossibility of considering one's own and others' interests on
perfectly equal terms.
Apart from the specific interventions by fiscal methods and the
change-over from a turnover to a value-added tax, the general character
of the French tax system cannot be said to have played an important
role in the growth process. Fiscal policy as a whole was inflationary as
the government found it impossible to finance the two wars out of taxes.
The burden of personal income taxes was lighter than in the United
Kingdom or the United States, but personal saving did not constitute
an important source of capital. As for the level of business taxation, it
cannot be said to be light, though tax relief has been used selectively
to favor investment by certain industries. The French experience is
interesting as a study of selective state intervention for growth. But all
in all, I do not believe that it sheds much light on the desirability of
different combinations of direct and indirect taxes.
3. Germany (Federal Republic)
While German growth must also be viewed primarily in terms of the
configuration of historical circumstance, the role of the tax system in
fostering growth can be seen more clearly. The German labor force has
had the potential of high productivity for a number of decades. Both
mechanical skills and the attitude toward work have been favorable.
The population has also been eager to accumulate capital both personally
and as managers of business. It was only the Great Depression, the war,
and the temporary disorganization of the economy at the end of the
war which kept German output from developing to its full potential.
After the currency reform restored order to the economy, and after the
Marshall Plan aid gave a massive infusion of capital to help start a
self-generating growth process, the German economy moved ahead
quickly and steadily. The influx of East German refugees made for an
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abundant supply of labor until the end of the 1950's and impressed
upon the government and private decision-makers the imperative neces-
sity of economic expansion.
General fiscal policy was not particularly restrictive. On the whole,
demand pressed on the supply of output through most of the period.
Thus, expansion was largely a production problem, and there was no
question that the extra output made possible by the high rate of capital
formation would find a ready market.
The pattern of domestic demand also reinforced the growth process.
There was a great demand for consumer durables and for housing, which
led to major expansion in the metals and other heavy industries.
Perhaps most important was the rise in German exports at the fan-
tastic rate of 15 per cent a year from 1950 to 1961. This export success
can be attributed to several factors: First, to some extent it represented
the recapture of markets in the Balkans, Turkey, and the Middle East,
which traditionally had been German markets. Second, the economic
integration of a rapidly growing Western Europe, first through trade
liberalization and then through the formation of the Common Market,
made for a big increase in exports within Europe. Third, German export
prices behaved substantially better than American or British export
prices, and permitted Germany to gain in other markets and in the U.S.
Fourth, German business takes exports seriously, sends some of its best
personnel abroad, and works hard at pleasing foreign customers. Fifth,
the government helped promote exports by assuring the availability
of export credit and by giving a rebate on the turnover tax.
The key element in the German export story is perhaps the stability
of export prices, even in the face of the great increase in sales and a
progressively tighter labor market. This cost stability is primarily due
to the tremendous increase of productivity which was associated with
the expansion of output, partly because of economies of scale and partly
because of the introduction of new technology. Thus, even though wages
rose by relatively large amounts, unit labor costs did not increase, even
while Germany's main competitors were suffering from rising costs of
exports.
The tax system was the main instrument of economic policy for
growth. Before 1950, selective devices were used. To foster personal
saving, income put into savings accounts for a minimum period was
exempted from income taxation. Depreciation allowances were liber-
alized, and in order to draw capital into the reconstruction of some
heavy industries, special depreciation allowances were instituted for
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them, and moral suasion was used to make certain industries provide
capital to the basic sectors. After 1950, the emphasis changed from selec-
tive devices toward general rate reduction. The burden of direct taxation
was made substantially lighter, both on business and on households,
sufficiently light that the enormous needs for capital for economic ex-
pansion could be met out of private sources. Further, the development
of the private capital market was fostered through the preferential tax
treatment accorded to distributed profits as opposed to retained earnings.
4. United Kingdom
Many of the arguments offered to explain the high growth in the
continental countries should also be applicable to the United Kingdom.
Per capita real income levels were about the same, consumption of dura-
ble goods was heavy, and there also was catching up to do because of
the war and the depression. What went wrong?
I think it is more difficult to explain the British failure to grow rapidly
than to account for continental successes. One can point to weakness
of entrepreneurship; but that argument was made about France not so
long ago. Protected markets sheltered inefficient firms, but are British
tariffs higher than on the continent? Perhaps the attitudes of unions
toward technological change were worse and there may have been other
intangible factors. Major selective measures of tax policy, including ini-
tial allowances and investment allowances, were •taken to stimulate
capital formation, yet they clearly did not suffice to assure successful
growth.
Among the more objective factors, two can be singled out. First,
British export experience was rather poor despite considerable govern-
ment exhortation. British export prices rose under the impetus of do-
mestic inflation and a stubborn retention of a fixed exchange rate. With
export markets difficult to maintain under deteriorating price conditions
and with domestic demand kept high most of the time, business returns
on marketing effort were greater at home than abroad. Further, the
frequent balance-of-payment crises led to sudden tightening of fiscal
and monetary policies which interfered with the growth process.24
The other strategic phenomenon is the low savings rate. The United
Kingdom saved and invested less than the continental countries, partly
reflecting a: particularly progressive direct-tax system. The low savings
24Fora discussion of the effect of balance of payment movements on investment,
see Ragnar Nurkse, "The Relationship between Home Investment and External
Balance in the Light of British Experience, 1945 to 1955," Review of Economics and
Statistics, May 1956, pp. 121—154.
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may well have kept the British economy from growing at a higher rate.
Shortage of capital was a significant phenomenon, particularly during
the balance-of-payment crises. It would be a mistake to attribute the
entire slow growth to this one factor, however. The tax treatment of
depreciation was liberal, and generous investment allowances were in-
stituted. The incremental capital-output ratio in the United Kingdom
was high, so that each dollar of investment produced relatively little
extra output.
While these comments are meant to suggest some of the possible
reasons for the relatively slower growth of the United Kingdom, I can












Source:Cohn in Dimensions of Soviet
Economic Power.
capital investment in
constant prices divided by increase in out-
put per employee.
b1953_60
shows,the countries with high investment rates also had the most f a-
vorable incremental capital-output ratios. In a static, classical world, one
would expect the diminishing returns to additional investment to pro-
duce a negative relationship between the rate of investment and the
incremental capital-output ratios. Thus, either there are economies of
scale to additional investment for industrial economies at the present
stage of European development, or the capital-output ratio was much
less favorable in the U.K. for other reasons.
IV. Conclusions
A. EUROPEAN TAX SYSTEMS
Europe is no tax paradise, not even for the rich or for corporations. The
total level of taxation in relation to GNP is greater than in the United
States. Direct taxation as a whole is of the same general magnitude
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in Germany and the TJnited Kingdom (and other northern countries
such as the Netherlands, Sweden, and Norway not studied in this paper)
as in the United States. It is lower in France and Italy, with their
different tax traditions. The extent of nominal progression is lower on
the continent than here, but if the proposed tax program is enacted, our
tax system will no longer differ so greatly even in this respect. The direct
taxation of business is fairly uniform among the countries, with the
heaviest burden probably in Germany.
B. TAXES AND EUROPEAN GROWTH: RELEVANCE OF THE FINDINGS
FOR THE UNITED STATES
European experience can be considered relevant in two senses. First, it
can be viewed as a shopping list of individual policy measures. Since
Europe grew more rapidly than the U.S., all European experience has
the happy validation of success. Liberalized depreciation and other in-
vestment incentives first caught the American eye. French planning
and the value-added tax are the current rage. Devaluation has not
achieved a similar popularity, though it certainly had much to do with
European growth.
The other sense in which European experience can be considered
relevant is for an analysis of the over-all economic strategy that was
pursued, particularly the budget policies which achieved both full em-
ployment and a high investment rate. Could this strategy succeed for
the United States as well?
1. A Value-Added Tax for the United &ate.s?
In the United States, the value-added tax would presumably not be
used as a substitute for other indirect taxes, but rather as a partial or
complete replacement for the corporation income tax. Such a change
would have seven important effects:
1. Corporations with high profits would be taxed less, unsuccessful
corporations would be taxed more. From the point of view of an efficient
allocation of investment, such a tax change would be desirable, since it
would lead to a greater internal generation of capital in profitable indus-
tries where returns are high, at the same time tending to withdraw
capital from the declining sectors. This argument does not apply to
profits which result from monopoly power.
While desirable from an efficiency point of view, the heavier taxation
of unsuccessful companies would lead to major problems of adjustment.
As long as the economy as a whole is not in a state of full employment, a
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deliberate worsening of the situation of the declining industries cannot
be undertaken lightly.
2. The tax would lead to the substitution of capital for labor, i.e.,
it would hasten automation. This is because a value-added tax would
fall both on labor and capital inputs, while the corporation income tax
only falls on the return to capital. Capital deepening may be desirable
in the long run, but in the present situation of general unemployment
the government should hardly seek to increase technological displace-
ment of workers.
3. The tax could be imposed upon a broader range of business organi-
zations than corporations, bringing cooperatives, mutual financial insti-
tutions, unincorporated business, and possibly even state enterprises
into the tax base. This broadening of the base would be desirable, and
if a new tax provides the opportunity for this major reform it would
be a strong argument for the tax. It is a political question whether the
unincorporated businesses could succeed in gaining exemption from the
tax in Congress.
4. The value-added tax would have lower marginal rates to yield
the same amount of revenue. This would remove some of the tax-caused
distortions in decision-making in such areas as expense accounts.
5. A switch to the value-added tax would raise the amount of business
saving, particularly if it could be passed on in higher prices to a greater
extent than the corporation income tax. Under full employment, a higher
savings rate would be desirable for the sake of economic growth. Whether
a regearing of the tax system toward more saving under present condi-
tions is desirable is a broader issue (see below).
6. The value-added tax would be a weaker automatic stabilizer than
the corporation income tax, since profits are more sensitive to cyclical
changes than value added. The loss in automatic stabilization would be
substantial.
7. The tax would encourage exports, provided that exported goods
are free of tax.25
2. A High Rate of Saving Strategy?
It would theoretically be possible for the United States to duplicate
the European experiences of the 1950's by gearing its tax system to
permit a high saving and investment rate for economic growth. We
could change our tax system so as to produce more saving and then run
26 See the paper by Musgrave and Richman in this volume for an analysis of the
several effects through which exports are influenced.
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budget deficits of sufficient magnitude to have total spending equal
to total potential output. The deficits required for this strategy would
be larger than those under the present tax system. If we did not enlarge
the deficits to offset the saving, the restructuring of the tax system
would merely produce a decline in total demand, lower utilization rates
in industry, lower before-tax profits, and create more unemployment.26
Unlike the European countries, the United States gives no evidence
that capital is particularly scarce. The capital markets have been rela-
tively easy for over three years. Corporations are in a relatively liquid
position. The capital-output ratio is substantially greater than in the
rapid-growth European countries. In this connection, the role of resi-
dential construction must be particularly considered. It has been our
general experience that residential construction can absorb great quanti-
ties of capital when it is available on cheap terms. While better housing
no doubt has some effect on worker productivity, it cannot be said to
give the same stimulus to growth as industrial capital formation, which
can embody new technology and raise the marginal productivity of labor
more directly. If a successful strategy of a higher saving rate were to
result primarily in a greater volume of residential construction, one
could not expect as favorable a result for economic growth as Europe
obtained from its high saving rates.
What about the future? The proposed tax program, if combined with
favorable developments in the private economy, should return us to full
employment by 1966. In that happy event, the issue of raising the saving
rate can more properly be raised, and proposals for alternative methods
of taxation, such as the value-added tax, should then be given a full
hearing.
Let me conclude on the question around which this Conference is
organized. Does the United States have too much direct taxation? This
question has to be answered in the light of the statistical evidence and
the tax proposals now before Congress. The widely used and startling
figures of Table 1, which show the U.S. tax system to be wholly out
of line with that of every other country, are derived from a statistical
fallacy. Any meaningful set of comparisons shows the differences in tax
systems among countries to be much smaller, with the German system
in particular resembling that of the United States.
More important, the tax changes already enacted—depreciation re-
Fora further discussion of these issues, see my paper "The Tax Structure and
the Functioning of the Economy," Proceedings of the National Tax Association for
196Pd, pp. 243—245.
249EUROPEAN AND U.S. TAX STRUCTURES
form and the investment credit—are largely27 reductions of direct taxes.
The current proposals consist wholly of very large reductions in direct
taxes; they also remove the most objectionable feature of our direct-tax
system, the extreme nominal progression of the income tax. It seems
to me that we have done enough to redress the balance between direct
and indirect taxes in the United States, at least for the moment.
27Excisetaxes on transportation have also been cut.
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THIS appendix presents some of the structural characteristics of the
maj or taxes of the tax systems of the countries discussed in the Eckstein
paper. It is presented here as background and to provide some support-
ing detail to the tables and discussion of the paper.
Unless otherwise indicated, the tax systems are described as they were
during 1961.
I. Personal Income Taxes andOtherTaxes on Persons
FRANCE
France has a progressive personal income tax on total income and a
complementary tax (taxe corn plémentaire) on income from profits, land,
and buildings.
Personal Income Tax (ImpOt sur le Revenue des Per.sonnes Physiques)
1. The rates of this tax for a single person without dependents are
as follows (5 NF =$1):








64,000 and over 65
While the maximum marginal rate is 65 per cent, the marginal effective
rate is limited to 55 per cent. When taxable income per unit exceeds
8,000 NF, a 5 per cent surcharge is added to the tax. Income below
70 NF is not taxed.
2. France provides extensive income-splitting for families. Income is
split among family "units," with each unit taxed separately on its share
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of the total income. The determination of the number of units is not
straightforward, however, since there is not a one-to-one relationship
between the number of persons constituting the family and the number
of units allowed for taxation purposes. Some typical cases are shown
below:
Number of Units
Single with no dependents 1.0
Married without children 2.0
Single or divorced with two dependents 2.5
Married with two dependent children 3.0
Each additional child 0.5
3. Wages and salaries are reduced by 10 per cent for "occupational
expenses," with a further reduction of 20 per cent on the remaining
amount before it is added to other income to compute taxable income.
Furthermore, once the tax has been calculated it is reduced by 5 per
cent of the salaries and wages included in the computation of taxable
income; this deduction must be viewed in combination with the payroll
tax of 5 per cent paid by business, which is in a sense a substitute.
4. The tax on dividends is withheld at the source at the rate of 24
per cent. The taxpayer includes the dividends in his income and deducts
the tax withheld at the source from the total tax.
5. Capital gains are not usually taxed in the case of individuals ex-
cept when they arise in connection with a business.
Complementary Tax (Taxe Corn plémentaire)
This is usually charged only on incomes from profits, land, and build-
ings and not on incomes from wages and salaries.
1. In 1960 and 1961 the rate was 8 per cent; in 1963 it was 6 per cent.
2. Exemptions are 4,400 NF for profits from a profession or a handi-
craft trade and 3,000 NF for profits from other sources (industrial,
cultural, etc.).
GERMANY
Personal Income Tax (Einkommen.steuer)
This is a progressive tax levied on total income. Taxable income in-
cludes the imputed rental value of owner-occupied property. The reve-
nues from this tax are shared between the federal government (35 per
cent) and the Lander (65 per cent). It provides more than 50 per cent
of the fiscal revenues of the Lander.
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1. The effective rates at various levels of income for single persons
are as follows (4 DM =$1):
Effective Rate











The tax on married persons can be calculated by deducting the allow-
ances for children from taxable income, ascertaining the tax on half
this amount and multiplying by two.
The methods by which these rates are obtained, together with the
various deductions and exemptions, are described below.
For taxable incomes from 1,680 DM to 8,009 DM, the tax rate is 20
per cent. This rate is given by the formula 0.2[Y —(900+ 780)], where
Y is the taxable income rounded to the closest thousand.
For taxable incomes between 8,010 DM and 23,999 DM, the tax is
given by the formula 0.2[8,000 —(900+ 780) + 272Y + 2.9Y2], where
Y is the part of the taxable income rounded to the closest thousand
above 8,000 DM.
For taxable incomes between 24,000 DM and 110,039 DM, the for-
mula is 6358 + 382Y + 1.572Y2 —0.006Y3,where Y is the figure of
taxable income which exceeds 24,000 DM, rounded to the nearest
thousand.
The marginal rate for any part of income exceeding 110,040 DM is 53
per cent.
2. The law allows a basic deduction of 564 DM from wages and
salaries in order to cover the expenses connected with employment.
When the expenses are itemized and exceed 564 DM, a further deduction
is given. When the income originates from capital rather than from
labor, the deduction is 150 DM for single and married persons.
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Subject to certain specified limits, interest on loans, annuities, pre-
miums for life, sickness, accident and unemployment insurance, medical
expenses, charitable contributions, certain local taxes, and taxes on
capital may be deducted from taxable income. Persons may use as an
alternative a standard deduction of 636 DM for wage and salary earners
and 200 DM for others.
The personal exemption from income is 1680 DM each for the tax-
payer and his wife and 1200 DM, 1680 DM, and 1800 DM, respectively,
for one, two, and three or more children. Taxpayers over 50 years of
age receive an extra exemption of 840 DM or 1200 DM under certain
conditions. Taxpayers over 70 get an additional exemption of 600 DM.
In addition to personal exemptions and deductions, relief is provided
families by income-splitting.
3. Capital gains are taxed as a general rule only if they are derived
from professional trades; however, capital gains from the sale of movable
assets are taxed if the holding period is less than six months. Capital
gains on real estate are taxed if the holding period is less than two years.
Capital gains associated with the sale of stock are taxed only if the per-
son holds more than 25 per cent of the total stock outstanding and the
sale exceeds 1 per cent of the nominal capital of the company.
4. Individuals, like corporations, are subject to a net worth tax
(Vermogensteuer) of .75 to 1 per cent on their net wealth (see Section
III below for details).
ITALY
Personal Income Tax: &hedular Taxes
Italy is the only country among the four under consideration with a
schedular tax system, in which the income of every individual is classi-
fied according to certain schedules. Each schedule has its own rates,
with substantial differences among them. The schedular taxes are as
follows:
1. The tax on undeveloped land (imposta sui terreni) is a tax imposed
at a rate of 10 per cent on the income value of land as shown on a general
land register. Surcharges are imposed by provincial and municipal gov-
ernments. These may amount to 20 per cent of the income value of
the land.
2. The tax on buildings (imposta sui fabbricati) is a tax on the rent
from buildings at a rate of 5 per cent. When the owner occupies the
property, an imputed rent is used as the basis of taxation. The rent is
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reduced by one-fourth before the tax is applied, in recognition of the
depreciation of the building. However, there are also provincial and
municipal government rates, which may bring the combined figure to as
high as 32.5 per cent.
3. The rate of the tax on income from agriculture (imposta sui redditi
agrari) is 23 per cent.
4. The schedule for the tax on income from capital, capital and labor,
and professions and employment (impost a di ricchezza mobile) subdivides
income into four categories and each is taxed according to its appropriate
rate. These categories with the respective rates are shown in Table 1.
TABLE1
RATES OF TAX 014 INCOME FROM CAPITAL,. CAPITAL AND













(interest etc.) 23 23 23 23
LIncome from capital
and labor combined
(business profits) 0 9 18 20
C1.Professional income 0 4 8 8
C2.Employment income 0 4 8 8
Note:$1 625 L.
PersonalIncome Tax: Global Tax on Income
(Imposta Corn plementare Pro gressiva sul Reddito Corn plessivo)
Total income, the sum of the incomes on the several schedules, is
taxed by the global tax, which alone gives some progressivity to the
system. The global tax rate ranges from 2 to 50 per cent on incomes
over 500,000,000 lire (see Table 2). Since incomes of this magnitude are
very rare in Italy, the very high rates are of negligible importance. The
total revenues from the global tax for the year 1959—60 were only 73
billion lire, or about 2.4 per cent of total fiscal revenues. The scale for
the global tax on income is obtained from the formula: Y =0.023015'/x
—0.0000472x+ 0.00874, where V is the tax and x is the income in mil-
lion lire.
There is a personal exemption of 240,000 L and exemptions of 50,000 L
each for the spouse and each dependent child. Incomes of less than












240 2 20,000 11.05
500 2.50 30,000 13.34
1,000 3.17 40,000 15.25
2,000 4.12 50,000 16.92
3,000 4.85 70,000 19.81
4,000 5.46 90,000 22.29
5,000 6.0 100,000 23.43
6,000 6.49 150,000 28.37
7,000 6.93 200,000 32.49
8,000 7.35 250,000 36.10






aThe scale for the global taxon income is obtained from the formula:
Y0.023025 —0.0000472X +0.00874,
where 1 is the tax and X is the income in million lire.This formula
when solved gives the scale in the above table.
Forthe purpose of this tax, the income of the wife (if any) is added
to that of the husband. Most of the other taxes on income (schedular
taxes) can be deducted in computing the taxable income for the pur-
poses of imposta corn plement are.
The combined burden of the schedular tax and the progressive global
tax is illustrated by Table 3, for an employed person, married and with
two children.
Capital gains are not taxed.
Family Tax (Imposta di Famiglia)
This is a local community tax on the global income of the whole
family, with rates varying from community to community. The rate
structure is usually progressive, the maximum rate which can be imposed
being 14.4 per cent, the minimum 2 per cent. The tax provides about
17 per cent of the total revenues of the communities.
UNITED KINGDOM
The United Kingdom income tax structure includes an income tax and
a surtax.
1. The income tax is charged, in principle, at a flat rate (the standard
rate) of 38.75 per cent. Progressivity, however, is provided by a number
of personal deductions and other relief devices.
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TABLE3








Annual Salary additions) 10% additions) Lire Per Cent
875 39 12 51 5.8
1,750 112 47 159 9.1
2,625 189 97 286 10.9
3,500 266 155 421 12.0
4,375 343 224 567 13.0
5,250 420 296 716 13.6
7,000 574 448 1,022 14.6
8,750 728 639 1,367 15.6
17,500 1,498 1,794 3,292 18.8
26,250 2,268 3,257 5,525 21.0
43,750 3,808 6,900 10,708 24.5
Source:E. B. Nortcliffe, Common Market Fiscal Systems, London,
1960, p. 6.
Theincome tax is levied under the following five different schedules
according to the nature and source of income:
Schedule A: Income from land, buildings etc., including, until 1963,
the imputed rent of owner-occupied houses.
Schedule B: Income from forest land.
Schedule C: Interest from government securities.
Schedule D: Profits of trades, businesses, professions, interest on loans,
income from abroad, etc.
Schedule E: Income from employment.
The method of assessment of the income depends on the schedule in
which it falls, but the rates are uniform on all schedules.
Taxable income of individuals over £2000 is subject to the surtax.
The following shows the rate of surtax at selected levels of income:
Surtax Surtax
Net Income (percent) Net Income (ak) (per cent)
0—2,000 0 5,000— 6,000 27.5
2,000—2,500 10.0 6,000— 8,000 32.5
2,500—3,000 12.5 8,000—10,000 37.5
3,000—4,000 17.5 10,000—12,000 42.5
4,000—5,000 22.5 12,000—15,000 47.5
Over 15,000 50.0
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2. The United Kingdom does not allow income-splitting for married
couples. The incomes of husband and wife are combined and taxed at the
regular rates. Limited relief is provided by the fact that a larger personal
exemption is given to married persons than to single persons, £240 and
£140, respectively. For children below 11 years of age, the allowance is
£100; for those between 11 and 16, £125; for students over 16, it is £150.
Besides these allowances, the first £360 of taxable income is taxed
at lower rates: the first £60 is taxed at 8.75 per cent; the next £150 at
21.25 per cent; and the next £150 at 31.25 per cent (as of 1962). The
TABLE
INCOMETAX ANDSURTAX ONSPECIMEN INCOMES OF SINGLE











(pounds) Pounds Per Cent Pounds Per Cent
SINGLE PERSON
500 49 9.80 84 16.80
1,000 192 19.20 277 27.70
2,000 493 24.65 665 33.25
3,000 794 26.47 1,165 38.83
5,000 1,440 28.80 2,340 46.80
10,000 4,098 40.98 5,952 59.52
100,000 83,227 83.23 85,602 85.60
MARRIED COUPLE WITHOUT CHILDREN
500 24 4.80 52 10.40
1,000 152 15.20 239 23.90
2,000 454 22.70 626 31.30
3,000 756 25.20 1,114 37.13
5,000 1,401 28.02 2,279 45.58
10,000 4,027 40.27 5,876 58.76
100,000 83,138 83.14 85,514 85.51




rates were changed in 1963 as follows: the first £100 at 20 per cent, the
next £200 at 30 per cent. There are further allowances for earned in-
come: two-ninths of the gross income earned, up to £4,005, and one-
ninth of the income between £4,005 and £9,945 may be deducted from
taxable income. Thus, there is a maximum possible allowance of £1,550
on an earned income of £9,995 or more. Earned income includes invest-
ment income of persons whose total income does not exceed £300 and
persons over 65 years of age with incomes under £800.
The burden of the income tax and surtax when all the allowances
permitted are taken into consideration is shown in Tables 4 and 5.
Capital gains are not taxed in the United Kingdom.
TABLE5
INCOME TAXON SPECIMENINCOMES OFMARRIED













Pounds Per Cent Pounds Per Cent Pounds Per Cent
500 4 .80 — —— —— ——
1,000 114 11.40 77 7.7 46 4.60
2,000 416 20.80 377 18.85 338 16.90
3,000 717 23.90 678 22.60 639 21.30
5,000 1,363 27.26 1,324 26.48 1,286 25.72
10,000 3,956 39.56 3,885 38.85 3,813 38.13
100,000 83,050 83.05 82,961 82.96 82,872 82.87
Source:Income Taxation in the U.K., U.S. Department of Commerce, Economic
Reports.
II. CorporateTaxes and Other Taxes on
Notall the countries under consideration tax the income of corporations
separately. There is a separate tax in France, Germany, the United
Kingdom, and the United States, but not in Italy. This section will
describe briefly the legal structure of this tax in each of the countries.
FRANCE
Corporate Income Tax (Impôt sur les Sociétés)
All incorporated enterprises in France are subject to this tax.
1. The rate of the corporate income tax is a flat 50 per cent on the
total profits of the corporation. In general, no reduction is granted on
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the part of the profits that is distributed; the corporation is, further-
more, required to withhold a tax of 24 per cent of the dividends (impót
unique, retenue a la source). However, dividends paid on new shares
issued for purposes approved by the government are deductible. Fur-
thermore, under certain conditions, dividends received by a parent com-
pany are exempted from the 24 per cent deduction at the source. This
withheld tax on dividends is credited by the shareholder against the
progressive income tax which is charged on his total income including
the dividends received.
2. In the evaluation of its total profits, the corporation is required
to include any gains which arise from the sale of assets. If the capital
gains are reinvested within three years, they are not taxed. Capital
gains realized by the transfer or cessation of the business are normally
taxed if such transfer or cessation has taken place less than five years
from the day of formation of the business; they are taxed at reduced
rates if the cessation or transfer has occurred after five years. Since 1962,
capital gains on land held less than seven years have been taxed at 25
per cent.
3. The basis for depreciation is either the declining-balance method
(permitted since January 1, 1960) or the straight-line method. After
January 1, 1965, the declining-balance method will be compulsory. The
basis for the computation is the original cost.
4. Losses may be carried forward for five years as an offset against
profits.
5. There are no investment allowances in France.
6. No tax-free reserves for the replacement of the capital assets are
allowed.
7. Current expenditures incurred on scientific or technical research
and development are deductible from income in the year in which they
are incurred.
Other Taxes on Business
1. Businesses are subject to a payroll tax (versement forfaitaire) on
the salaries and wages paid to the employees in a year. The rates for
this tax are: 5 per cent on total payroll of each employee not exceeding
30,000 NF; 10 per cent on the excess over 30,000 NF up to 60,000 NF;
and 16 per cent on any excess over 60,000 NF.
2. The business licence tax (contribution des patentes) is a local tax
which any person or legal entity involved in any business transactions
260EUROPEAN TAX SYSTEMS
must bear. The rate is flat and varies from establishment to establish-
ment according to production, number of employees, etc.
GERMANY
Corporate Income Tax (Korperschaftsteuer)
This is a tax on the profits of corporations and other legal entities
operated for profit. The revenues from this tax are shared between the
federal government (35 per cent) and the Lander (65 per cent). The tax
provides about 6 per cent of the revenues of the federal government
and about 20 per cent of those of the Lander.
1. The basic rate is 51 per cent on retained profits for incorporated
companies and 49 per cent for unincorporated associations. The portion
of profits of incorporated firms which is distributed to the stockholders
is taxed at the preferential rate of 15 per cent.
Dividends cannot be deducted as expenses for the purposes of the
corporation tax.
The arrangement by which dividends receive preferential treatment
helps the firms which rely on the capital market for funds, but may
create serious difficulties for some small firms. The law has tried to
meet these difficulties by giving these firms the opportunity to choose a
progressive scale of taxation which reduces the difference in tax burden
between distributed and undistributed profits. In order to qualify, a
firm must have at least 76 per cent of its share capital in the hands of
private persons, it must have its shares in registered form, and its net
worth must not exceed 5 million DM. For these firms the maximum
rate of 49 per cent is reached at 50,000 DM, while the rate on the dis-
tributed profits is 26.5 per cent.
The law includes many provisions which seek to prevent tax evasion
taking the form of distributing profits from one company to a dependent
one. The receiving companies are required to distribute the profits
received.
Profits are computed by valuing the ilet worth of the companies at
the beginning and the end of the fiscal period. Inventories are to be
valued either at the initial value or at the market value if the latter
is lower.
2. All capital gains from any source are normally taxed as profits.
3. The basis for depreciation is the historical cost of the asset. As a
rule, the straight-line method is used, but in the case of movable business
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assets the declining-balance method is also permitted, with the limita-
tion that the depreciation cannot be more than twice that calculated
by the straight-line method nor can it exceed 20 per cent. Sometimes
the Teilwert basis may be used, which is defined as "that part of the
total value of the business as a going concern which is attributable to
the asset." For example, if an asset costs 1 million DM and the accu-
mulated depreciation is 500,000 DM, and thus the book value is 500,000
DM, but the imputed real value of the asset is only 400,000 DM, then
the imputed value (the Teilwert) is substituted for the book value and
the difference between the book value (500,000 DM) and the imputed
value (400,000 DM) is taken as additional depreciation.
There are no standard rules regulating the period of depreciation,
allowances for which must be negotiated in each case. In some special
cases accelerated depreciation is permitted.
4. Losses may be carried forward for five years as an offset against
profits.
5. There are no investment allowances.
6. Two kinds of tax-free reserves are permitted: The first is for in-
crease of prices (Rucklage für Preissteigerung), for cases in which the
replacement value of an asset has increased by more than 10 per cent
over the year. Profit in excess of a return of 10 per cent attributable to
the price increase may be currently excluded from taxable income but
must be included within six years. The second is for high replacement
cost (R'ücklage für Ersatzbeschaffung).
7. Expenditure on fundamental research (Grundlagenforschung) is in-
cluded in deductible expenses. The same is true for product development
Other Taxes on Business
1. The tax on industry and trade (Gewerbesteuer) is a very important
tax levied on behalf of the localities on all business enterprises, whether
incorporated or not. Three elements constitute the base for this tax:
profits of the enterprises, net worth, and payrolls.
The tax law provides basicY rates to which each municipality applies
its own coefficient (Hebesatze) to get its effective rates. The basic rates
are as follows: 5 per cent on profits, 0.2 per cent on net worth, and 0.2
per cent on payroll. The effective (actual) rates are substantially differ-
ent from the basic rates and vary from locality to locality. The average
effective rates however are: 13.55 per cent on profits, 0.54 per cent on
net worth, and 2 per cent on payroll. This tax provides about 70 per
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cent of the total revenues of the communities. It is deductible from
income for purposes of income or corporate tax.
2. Companies as well as individuals are subject to the net worth tax
(Vermöijen.steuer), which applies to the total assets of an enterprise. The
revenues go to the provincial governments (Lander). The tax provides,
together with the tax on individuals, about 6 per cent of the total revenue
of the Lander.
The rate is 1 per cent on the total value of the net assets of the com-
panies. This tax is not deductible from income for corporate tax.
ITALY
Italy, unlike the other countries under consideration, has a schedular
tax system with different tax rates for each schedule. For both individ-
uals and corporations, when the income arises out of business it is taxed
according to category B (imposte sui reditti di ricchezza mobile), the
category for income from capital and labor combined.
The rate on income under category B is 18 per cent for an income
up to 4 million lire and 20 per cent on the excess. Local taxes increase
the first rate to about 27.85 per cent and the second to 31.23 per cent.
There is no exemption for companies.
Nowhere does the Italian law state precisely what constitutes income
or how it is to be defined. In general, income (or profit) is assumed to be
the increase in net wealth accruing to the taxpayer (individual or com-
pany) as a result of the application of capital and labor.
Capital gains are always taxed as income.
Inventories are valued at either their original cost or market value.
Since 1951 the LIFO method has been permitted.
The basis for depreciation is the straight-line method, but other meth-
ods are also recognized. The tax authorities have set down for guidance
the maximum rates allowable on various types of assets, for certain
activities. These rates need not be followed, however. The basis of
valuation for depreciation purposes is the original cost of the asset.
The maximum authorized rates (in per cent) are listed below:
Rates
Buildings
Textile, paper, printing, rubber, and plastics industries 3






Rates for special machinery used in:
Chemical, metallurgical, and engineering industries 8—15
Mining 9—25
Office machines and furniture 10
Motor vehicles 20
Accelerated depreciation is allowed for assets requiring intensive use
and for new industries, for which the depreciation period is reduced by
two-fifths.
3. Since 1956 losses can be carried forward for a period of five years.
4. There are no investment allowances.
5. Usually no tax-free reserves are permitted. On the other hand,
due to the depreciation of the lire, some revaluation of assets has been
allowed.
6. Expenditure for research may be deducted in full in the year in
which it takes place, or a normal depreciation procedure may be used:
Other Taxes on Business
1. The company tax (imposta sulle societa) is not to be confused with
a corporation tax in the American sense. This is both a property tax
and a profits tax. The tax is made up of two parts: 15 per cent on the
portion of profit which exceeds 6 per cent of net worth, and 0.75 per
cent on the net worth itself. Thus the tax combines a capital and profit
element.
2. The tax on bonds and debentures (imposte sulle obbligazioni) ap-
pearing on the balance sheet of a company is at the rate of 0.5 per cent.
UNITED KINGDOM
Companies are subject to the same income tax which is levied on indi-
viduals and to a profits tax in addition.
1. The income tax is levied at the flat rate of 38.75 per cent, the same
as the "standard" rate on the income of individuals. However, while
individuals are permitted certain deductions, none are allowed for cor-
porations.
The profits tax is charged in addition to the income tax at the rate
of 15 per cent of profits. Thus the combined rate is 53.75 per cent. The
profits tax, however, does not apply to profits under £2000. For profits
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less than £12,000, the assessment is reduced by one-fifth of the balance
of £12,000.
In the case of a corporation, the income tax (38.75 per cent) does not
apply to both company profits and the dividends distributed from the
profits. The tax paid by the company on the part of profits distributed
as dividends is withheld from the dividend payments, and the stock-
holder receives a credit for this amount against his liability.
No statutory rule is provided for the valuation of inventories; cost
or market price, whichever is lower, is the usual practice. FIFO is the
standard procedure.
2. Capital gains are not usually taxed, and thus the United Kingdom
differs from the countries considered above.
3. The basis for depreciation for buildings is the original cost of con-
struction; for mineral deposits overseas, the price that the first U.K..
purchaser paid; for all others, the cost to the actual owner.
The method used for depreciation varies with the type of asset. A
straight-line method is required for industrial buildings and capital ex-
penditure on scientific research and patents. A straight-line or declining-
balance method is used for equipment, machinery, etc.
The rates of depreciation are as follows: 2 per cent per year for indus-
trial buildings; three-fifths in the first year and one-tenth in the remain-
ing years for capital expenditure on scientific research. If the taxpayer
follows standard established rates, however, once he has calculated the
annual depreciation charges, he is allowed to increase these charg€s
by multiplying them by
4.Losses may be carried forward against profits without time limit,
and in the event of cessation of business, they may be carried backward
for three years.
5. The United Kingdom grants several forms of investment allow-
ances. In the case of capital expenditure typical rates are: 10 per cent
for industrial buildings plus an initial allowance of 5 per cent; 20 per
cent for new machinery plus an initial allowance of 10 per cent; 20 per
cent for capital expenditure for mining, works, etc., plus a 20 per cent
initial allowance.
The investment allowance is in the nature of a bonus (depreciation
above 100 per cent) while the initial allowance reduces the subsequent
depreciation allowances.
6. Tax-free reserves are not generally allowed.
7. Current costs for research are deductible. Capital expenditure on
scientific research receives preferential treatment.
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III. Personal Capital Taxes
FRANCE, ITALY, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM
There are no special taxes on capital or wealth.
GERMANY
Germany has a net worth tax (Vermogensteuer) on both individuals
and corporations. The basis for the imposition of the tax is the net
value of all wealth that the individual or the corporation has on German
si1. The rate is either 1 per cent or .75 per cent. The revenues are
granted to the provinces (Lander). The revenues from this tax for
1960 were 1100 million DM, or 1.93 per cent of total federal and stat.e
taxes for that year.
IV. Succession and Gift Taxes
FRANCE
In France, gifts and successions are to the same levy. The only
succession and gift duty now in force is calculated with reference to the
value received by each beneficiary and according to his or her degree
of relationship to the deceased or the donor. The rates for property
passing in direct line or between husband and wife are as follows (in
per cent):
First 50,000 NF 5
Next 50,000 NF 10
Excess over 100,000 NF 15
The rates for property passing in other cases are (in per cent):
Between brothers and sisters 40
Between uncles, aunts, nephews,
nieces, etc., to third degree 50
Others 60
The duty thus calculated is increased by a surcharge when the bene-
ficiary is more than 30 years of age and childless. The surcharges are
15 per cent for married or widowed beneficiaries and 25 per cent for
single or divorced beneficiaries. There are significant exemptions: for a
direct-line descendant or husband or wife, the first 100,000 NF of the
gift or inheritance is tax-exempt.
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GERMANY
Succession duties are payable in Germany on property passing to each
beneficiary. The duty is calculated and charged separately on the be-
quest to each beneficiary. The rates vary from 2 to 60 per cent according
to the size of the estate and the degree of relationship. The exemption
varies from 30,000 DM, for surviving spouse or children, to 1,000 DM
for strangers.
ITALY
There are two death duties in Italy. The first is levied according to a
sliding scale on the total amount of the estate of the deceased. The
second is charged on the net amount received by each beneficiary on a
sliding scale which varies with the degree of relationship between the
deceased and the beneficiary (see Table 6).
Gifts are subject to the same duties. There are some basic exceptions.
TABLE6























0—1 1 1 2 3 5 15
10—15 9 9 12 22 25 46
50—75 20 20 25 41 51 70
Above500 35 35 40 60 70 80
UNITED KINGDOM
Estate duties are payable on the value of all property, real or personal,
which is transferred to other persons on the death of the owner. The
rates of taxation are shown in Table 7.
Business assets and land subjected to estate tax twice within a five-
year period are taxed the second time on a reduced scale.
V. Social Security
The social security programs of the Western European countries are
by far the most extensive in the world. It is for this reason that the













Up to: Up to:
3,000 0 45,000 28
4,000 1 50,000 31
5,000 2 60,000 35
7,500 3 75,000 40
10,000 4 100,000 45
12,000 6 150,000 50
15,000 8 200,000 55
17,500 10 300,000 60
20,000 12 500,000 65
25,000 15 750,000 70
30,000 18 1,000,000 75
35,000 21 Over 1,000,000 80
40,000 24
Source:Taxation in Western Europe, Federation of
British Industries, London, 1961, p. 175.
Relevantinformation on social security for the countries considered
is summarized in Table 8.
VI. Indirect Taxes
FRANCE
Taxesur le Chiffre d'Affaires
This tax is made up of three separate taxes, of which the first is by
far the most important. These are:
1. The value-added tax (taxe.surla valeur ajoutée). Unlike the turn-
over tax of Germany and Italy, this tax is charged only on the value
added in a given enterprise. Value added is the difference between the
selling price of the product and the cost of the various inputs used in
producing the product which had already been subject to tax. Because
this tax is charged only on the value added in the enterprise, it is not
cumulative and thus does not pyramid. The tax is actually calculated
by applying the tax rate to gross taxable sales and then deducting from
this figure all taxes paid on purchases during the period. Exports are
exempt, and all taxes paid on exported goods at earlier stages in the
production and distribution channels are refunded.
The normal rate is 20 per cent on value including tax. Lower rates



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































and higher rates (23 and 25 per cent) to certain goods regarded as
luxuries.
The tax is a major element in the French tax system, yielding about
25 per cent of the total tax revenue.
2. Tax on services (taxe sur les prestations de services). The performing
of certain services is subject to a separate services tax, in lieu of the
value-added tax. The tax is paid by those who perform the services,
but they normally bill it separately on the invoice to the customer.
The normal rate is 8.5 per cent, with a 12 per cent rate on certain
categories. This tax yields about 3 per cent of the total tax revenues.
3. Local tax (taxe locale). This is typically a tax on the retail sales
of commodities, levied for the benefit of local government units. The
tax is also applied to certain services not taxed by the tax on services
(e.g., brokerage, etc.).
The normal rate is 2.75 per cent but can be increased to 8.50 per cent
for certain commodities. The revenues from this tax are distributed as
follows: from 60 to 70 per cent goes to the municipalities, and 15 per
cent to the départements. The remainder goes to the Fonds National de




The German turnover tax is, unlike the French one, of a cascade
type; that is, it is a multiple-stage tax. Each transaction is taxed on the
basis of gross receipts rather than value added.
Exports are exempted from this tax, as are wholesale sales of certain
foodstuffs and raw materials.
The basic rate is 4 per cent. For food products, the rate is 3 per cent;
for products of the forestry industry, 1.5 per cent; for sales by whole-
salers, 1 per cent.
This is an extremely important tax in the fiscal system of Germany,
providing about 45 per cent of the fiscal revenues of the federal govern-
ment and about 25 per cent of the total fiscal revenues of all levels
of government.
ITALY
Turnover Tax (Imposta Generale sull'Entrata, I.G.E.)
The Italian turnover tax, like the German, is of the cascade type,
charged on each transfer down to, but not including, the retail level.
The tax is not levied on exports.
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The general rate is 3.3 per cent, with special rates for certain products
ranging from 0.60 to 9.90 per cent. The revenues from this tax average
about 23 per cent of the total revenues.
UNITED KINGDOM
Purchase Tax
This is a sales tax limited to specified categories of consumer goods.
It is collected on the last wholesale transaction.
The rates vary from 5 per cent on clothing and furniture to 50 per
cent on certain durable consumer goods and luxury goods.
INDIRECT TAXES ON SELECTED ITEMS
A table in Eckstein's paper has provided the percentages of total reve-
nues which derive from each major class of indirect taxes. The purpose
of this appendix, in this respect, is to provide some information on the
rates at which these items are taxed. The relevant information has been
-summarizedin Table 9, which follows this section. The figures have been
converted to dollars and cents to make comparison easier. The table is
limited to the main items but the taxes reported account for about 90
per cent of the total revenue from indirect taxation.
VII. Country Tax Systeims































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































DETAILED FISCAL REVENUES FOR CENTRAL GOVERNMENTOFFRANCE, 1960
(millionNF)
Revenues from direct contributions 20,617
Direct contributions collected by way of register
of emission
Taxes on societies 6,329
Payroll tax 4,486
Complementary tax 1,021
Revenues from registration 2,486
Passage of property through sales 708
Passage of property through donation 672
Special tax on insurance contracts 544
Other revenues 512
Stampduties 1,054
Duties on stock market operations 182
Custom duties 7,232
Import duties 1,336
Internal duties on petrol products 5,599
Other duties 297
Revenues from indirect contributions 1,053
Duties on liquor, wines, elders, etc. 197
Duties on alcohol 663
Other duties 193
Taxes on transport of goods 191
Turnover taxes 19,559
Value—added tax (TVA) 17,429
Tax on services (TPS) 2,060
Other 70
Revenue from other commodity taxes 1,978
Wine and cider 975
Meat 769
Coffee and tea 234
Total fiscal revenues 54,366
Source:Direction de la Comptabilite' Publique.
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TABLE11
F I SCAL REVENUE FOR FEDERAL LANDER, SAND
COMMJNITIESOF GERMANY, 1960
(millionDM)
Taxeson property and business 29,057
Wage tax 8,102





Land transfer tax 165
Capital transactions tax 235
Motor vehicle tax 1,475
Insurance tax 217











Other excise duties 387








Equalization of business levies 2,023








FISCAL REVENUES FOR CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OF ITALY, 1961
(million lire)
Direct taxes 848,157
On income from land and buildings 17,334





Tax on income from capital, etc. 495,915
Complementary progressive tax on total income 78,502
Company tax 136,384
Other direct taxes 50,910
Extraordinary direct taxes 69,112
Indirect business taxes 1,449,689
Estate and gift taxes
Register and stamp taxes 259,002
Turnover tax (I.G.E.) 831,217
Transport and circulation taxes 69,958
Taxes on radios 47,219
Entertainment tax 30,891
Other indirect taxes on business 166,617
Customs and indirect taxes on consumption 957,012









Taxes on consumption 53,148
Coffee 49,205
Cocoa 3,943
Customs and border duties 248,459











TAXES ON INCOME ANDCAPITALAND NATIONAL INSURANCE CONTRIBUTION,
BY TYPE OF PROPERTY, ANDSECTOR,UNITED KINGDOM, 1960
(million pounds)




National insurance and health contributions 911
Total 3,636





Dividends, interest, and trading incomes
Income tax 1,027
Surtax 118
Profits, excess profits tax, excess profits levy, etc. 262






Employees' insurance contributions 431
Pay of the forces
Income tax 26
Surtax 1







Land and buildings 35
Government and municipal securities 48
Other stocks and shares 109
Other forms of property 44
Total 236




TAXES ON CAPITAL, EXPENDITURES, AND OTHER REVENUES
OF CENTRAL l%O
(millionpounds)




Excess profits tax, excess profits levy, etc. 2
Taxes on capital 236
Death duties 236
Special contributions
Taxes on expenditures 2,641
Customs and excise duties 2,387
Beer 220








Motor vehicle license duties 123
Transport levy
Stamp duties 94
Post office surplus 5
Broadcast license revenue retained by exchequer S
Miscellaneous 27
Other revenue
National insurance and health contributions 911
Gross trading income 125
Gross rental income 70
Interest and dividends 339
Current grants from overseas governments
Total 7,047
Source:National Income and Expenditure, Central StatiBtical Office,
London, 1961.
COMMENT
FRITZ NEIJMARK, Goethe University, Frankfurt/Main,
and Columbia University
Since, on the one hand, my time is very short and, on the other, I am
hampered by my imperfect knowledge of your language, the praise-
criticism ratio of my comments on Eckstein's paper will be unduly low.
I think, however, that the author has done an excellent job and I
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agree with most, though not all, of his conclusions as well as with the
essence of his factual summary of European tax system structures. His
task (which he himself calls quite correctly "treacherous") was by no
means an easy one. Anyone who has tried to draw an exact picture of
the character and effective distribution of tax burdens in foreign coun-
tries will be aware of this.
In particular, I share Eckstein's view that many critics of the present
U.S. tax structure have fallen prey to statistical fallacies which have
led them to exaggerate the structural differences between the European
and American tax systems; it is one of the greatest merits of the paper
that it has revealed and corrected these errors. I find myself in agreement
also with the author's statement that most European countries are not
a "tax paradise" and that they did not achieve their combination of
strong economic growth and full employment by fiscal measures alone.
As to my critical comments, some of them are of a general and theoret-
ical nature but most of them refer to empirical questions. First of all,
I would like to say a few words on a point which seems to me of pre-
dominant importance to the topic of this conference, namely, the dis-
tinction between so-called direct and indirect taxes. There are several
possibilities of establishing scientifically satisfactory classifications of
taxes and William Feilner is certainly right in saying that classification
always includes an element of arbitrariness. But if one wants to maintain
the time-honored distinction between direct and indirect taxes, it has
to be based on a clear-cut, unequivocal criterion. The traditional dis-
tinction has been based upon tax shifting; unfortunately the extent to
which various taxes shift is not known. For example, a corporation tax
may or may not be shifted forward. Thus shiftabiity does not represent
a quality of only one group of taxes; there are obviously many exceptions
to the general rules. Some persons confine themselves to an enumeration
of taxes which they assign to each group without any clear-cut dis-
tinguishing criterion. This applies, for example, to Eckstein's classifica-
tion of property taxes as "indirect." He also includes employer contribu-
tions to social security in the indirect tax group, considering them as
"costs of carrying on business like any other tax on the use of a factor
of production; even if they are shifted to the employee, he will not
recognize them nor view them as a direct payment out of his income."
Here it seems that Eckstein refers at first to shiftability but since he is
not certain of its usefulness, he adds the "inconspicuousness" criterion.
However, this has lost much of its former importance because of changes
in fiscal techniques and various other factors. Thanks to the efforts of
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newspapers, trade unions, etc., to enlighten people, present-day tax-
payers are not as uninformed about the relations between excise duties
and consumer goods prices as their ancestors were. Withholding of
come tax at the source, on the other hand, has lessened taxpayer aware-
ness of this levy, so that as long as there are no substantial changes
in effective tax burdens, the average taxpayer considers only the "take-
home pay." From the point of view of democracy, it is a debatable issue
whether unawareness on the part of taxpayers of their burdens is
desirable.
A second general remark is that Eckstein throughout his paper neg-
lects the effects of the disbursement side of the taxation process, in
other words, public expenditures. It can be argued that in developed
countries the direct versus indirect tax controversy must take into ac-
count the fact that in the course of the last several decades, the distribu-
tion of benefits derived from public expenditures has changed in such a
way as to offset or more than offset the regressive effects of excise duties
and possibly of general sales taxes. This statement, however, is of greater
relevance for most European countries than for the United States.
My third general remark is not intended to contradict Eckstein's
conclusions but rather to amend them on one point. As he mentions, it
is often thought in this country that the astounding European economic
recovery and growth—to the extent that they can be ascribed to fiscal
measures—were due mainly to a high share of indirect taxation in the
over-all tax structure, relative to that in the United States. However,
it seems to me that on the whole, and particularly in France, Germany,
and Italy, differentials within the system of direct taxation had at least
an equal, and probably an even greater, importance for high saving and
investment rates that furthered growth. I refer particularly to low tax
rates and partial exemptions provided for retained profits used for re-
investment, on the one hand, and special allowances for personal savings,
on the other.
My next group of comments is on statistical and factual questions.
Eckstein, of course, is quite aware of the fact that tax statistics, if con-
fined to central governments alone, lead to erroneous conclusions since
the shares of the different levels of government in over-all government
finance vary considerably. Nevertheless, his paper contains several ta-
bles showing only central government figures. I would prefer to omit
such data since they are likely to be misused for political purposes.
The differences are clearly demonstrated in Eckstein's Table 11. The
importance of the German corporation tax for central government reve-
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nues appears to be only half that of the French tax, whereas with all
levels of government the share of the German tax is much higher than
that of the French one—in fact even more so than the OEEC data
quoted by Eckstein indicate.
As for his Table 6, the figures on the German personal income tax
are not exactly correct. For example, the maximum marginal rate is
given as 57.24 per cent, whereas it is actually 53 per cent. Even if one
adds the so-called church tax (generally neglected in the paper), which
is a 10 per cent supplement to income tax, the marginal rate mentioned
by Eckstein is still not quite correct. Besides, it is not clear whether
the exemptions shown in the table include, in addition to personal allow-
ances, lump-sum deductions for Werbungskosten, and for so-called "spe-
cial expenses." If both of these deductions are taken into account, Ger-
man income tax exemptions rise from $1560 to $1785.
Somewhat more important is the fact that Eckstein's view that in
Europe "capital gains are not taxed at all unless they originate from a
personal business" is not quite correct. As a matter of fact, in Germany,
capital gains are taxed at normal income tax rates provided they are
short-term gains, i.e., gains realized on securities held less than six
months, or real estate held less than two years.
On the question of evasion, I would like to add the following remark.
Eckstein mentions that countries with a Latin tradition such as France
and Italy are generally believed to have extensive evasion. He then
presents some figures which, in his opinion, show that "the deviations
are not as large as is often suggested." These figures, however, do not
seem to me to be very conclusive. First of all, they show that the ratio
of personal direct taxes to national income in France is only half the
corresponding German ratio, and the Italian one-half that in United
Kingdom; these are rather important differences. Second, it is not clear
whether in Table 8 Eckstein includes among French "direct taxes" the
versement forfaitaire (payroll tax paid by employers) as he does in Table
2. In this latter table, he does not take into account the German Gewer-
besteuer which at least partly corresponds to the French tax. Third, in
an earlier section of his paper, the author very correctly points out that
"the actual burden of taxation depends not only on the letter of the
law...butalso on the spirit of compliance and enforcement" and
that "a perfect comparison can only be obtained by living under each
of the tax systems and by dealing with each of the tax collectors."
Although in principle this is true, I believe that information gathered
from official reports as well as from private sources suffices to prove
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that in fact, the "propensity to evade" of—let us say—Mediterranean
taxpayers is much higher than that of Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian
taxpayers.
With respect to estate and gift taxes, Eckstein quotes the data given
by Norteliffe in his well-known book, Common. Market Fiscal Systems.
These data are not correct. Under the assumptions made by the author,
the German tax burden amounts not to 10 per cent but to more than
12 per cent.1
A. further point refers to the German Gewerbe.steuer and similar taxes
in France. I could not tell if Eckstein classified these taxes as direct or
indirect. This is important because the German trade tax (as Eckstein
calls it) is a rather heavy burden on business. Its yield according to
Eckstein is "equal to the corporation tax." This is an understatement.
Ever since 1953, the Gewerbesteuer has raised more revenue than cor-
poration income tax; estimates for 1963 are 9.26 and 8.46 billion DM,
respectively. Also, the paper gives some data on the trade tax (which it
rightly describes as the main source of revenue of municipalities) that
may lead the reader to false conclusions. On the one hand, the rates
mentioned are not general, uniform rates but rather weighted averages
of the various local rates. On the other hand, they give the impression
that the trade tax is universally assessed on profits, net worth, and wages
paid, whereas, in fact, the payroll tax is not an obligatory element of
the system and is collected only in a few—though rather important—
communities.
My last special remark relates to Eekstein's comments on the use of
selective devices. About Germany he says that "before 1950, selective
devices were used" whereas after that year, "the emphasis changed
from selective devices toward general rate reduction." This statement
is not entirely correct. It is true that tax reforms after 1953 tried to
abolish step by step the special depreciation allowances, exemptions,
rate differentials, etc., and to replace them by a series of rather sub-
stantial tax cuts which lowered the maximum marginal income tax
rate from 95 to 53 per cent. However, due to the strong influence of
pressure groups, the German government did not succeed in abolishing
all the selective devices just mentioned. In fact, in the course of the
last years, some new differentials were inserted not only in the income
and corporation tax laws but also in the turnover tax.
1Inthis connection, I would like to stress an error to be found in the appendix
to Eckstein's paper prepared by Vito Tanzi. The minimum exempted from the
German inheritance tax for a surviving spouse is given as 30,000 DM. In most
cases, however, it is 250,000 DM.
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To complete the review of the picture drawn in the paper of Ger-
many's postwar tax policy, I would like to stress the 'following two
points. First, Germany has made tax cuts not only in direct but also
in indirect taxation. This is true of excise duties on tobacco, coffee, tea,
champagne, etc. Second, the progressive lowering of nominal and effec-
tive tax rates for the purpose of stimulating economic growth was a
necessary condition for the uninterrupted rise in fiscal revenue. Between
1954 and 1963, tax revenues of all levels of government rose from 38.3
to 92.1 billion DM, and since 1959 the growth rate of tax yields has
exceeded that of GNP—in fact, the former rate averaged 14 per cent
between 1959 and 1961 compared to a GNP growth rate of 10.1 per cent.
These figures reflect the considerable built-in flexibility of the German
tax system, due primarily to personal income taxation. During the last
decade (1953—63), revenue from the personal income tax rose from 8.6
to 27.7 billion DM (222 per cent), representing percentages of the tax
total of 23.5 and 30.1, respectively. Compared to this, the yield of the
turnover tax—the second pillar of the German tax system—rose from
8.9 to 20.2 billion DM (127 per cent), but its relative importance de-
clined from 24.2 to 22 per cent; this is all the more remarkable as, in
contrast to the income tax rates, the general turnover tax rate remained
unchanged. Thus the turnover tax proved to be a relatively weak auto-
matic stabilizer.
Finally, I would like to raise the following points. As is stressed in
Eckstein's paper, structural differences between most European tax
systems and the American system will become rather small if and when
'U.S.incometaxes are reduced as proposed by the Kennedy administra-
tion. However, probably no modern state can do without some general
sales taxation. For the time being, the U.S. federal government is in a
position which permits it to refrain from using such taxes. On the other
hand, sales taxation is already used in a majority of the states as well
as in some municipalities. Most local tax revenue stems from property
taxes, which in some cases imply a debatable and one-sided tax burden
distribution. Therefore I would like to recommend an intergovernmental
tax reform which would provide the sharing of sales tax revenues in
order to allow a reduction in property tax rates.
DAN THROOP SMITH, Harvard 'University
Eckstein has given us his usual incisive and thoughtful analysis. His
general appraisal of the significance, and lack of significance, of the
general characteristics of the European tax system for the rate of growth
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seems reasonable. One would be quite unlikely to find conclusive evi-
dence of the effects of taxation on economic growth in view of all the
other relevant factors. This is especially so when the attributes of the
tax system are divided into such broad and nonhomogeneous categories
as direct and indirect taxation.
The dissimilar economic consequences of various forms of taxation
within the two broad categories is recognized by Eckstein, both explicitly
and implicitly, but emphasis on the nature of the probable differing
effects of different taxes within the broad categories appears more useful
than an analysis of definitions or possible modifications of the statistics.
Employees' contributions to social security funds and top-bracket
individual income taxes are both classified as direct taxes, but they seem
likely to have quite different effects on effort, on savings, on investment,
and on the demand for specific consumer goods. They may even have a
different incidence; if wage demands are geared to take-home pay, a
rise in social security contributions may lead to pay increases which
would not otherwise occur.
The high proportion of social security expenditures financed by general
revenues in the Tlnited Kingdom is notable. It is not clear, of course,
what particular forms of taxation are made correspondingly higher than
they otherwise would be, but it seems likely that a good deal of the
burden must fall on income or profits taxes. Employee contributions,
on the one hand, and income and profits taxes, on the other, would all be
considered as direct taxes and not differentiated in a general statistical
summary, though their probable impacts seem quite different. Eckstein's
paper, with Tanzi's appendix, does give the necessary breakdowns, in-
cluding rate scales for income taxation.
I would urge that further analysis be made of the probable signifi-
cance of some of the very important differences within the broad cate-
gories. Sometimes even apparent similarities may conceal important
differences. it is stated, for instance, that the effect of the withholding
presumption of the British income tax applicable to corporations and the
gross-up on dividends is to leave only the profits tax as the net tax
burden on distributed profits. With a 15 per cent profits tax rate, this
gives the same rate as in Germany. But this is an apparent similarity
with, I suggest, a profound difference.
In Germany, the corporation pays a lower rate by distributing some
of the income; in Great Britain, the full income tax rate applies to all
corporate income regardless of its distribution, and the statistical con-
clusion of a low net rate on distributed profits is based on the credit
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against personal tax allowed at thestockholder level. In terms of man-
agement attitudes toward distribution, stockholder pressures for distri-
bution, and availability of corporate funds for expansion, these two
approaches are altogether different. The inherent differences in structure
seem much more significant than the statistical similarities.
Differences in depreciation allowances and other investment credits
or allowances seem particularly important in an analysis of tax influences
on capital formation. The general absence of anything like the reserve
ratio test in Europe is a significant fact in making the relatively high
authorized depreciation rates available without restraint. The fact that
depreciation must be taken on a company's books if it is to be allowed
for tax purposes on the continent (though not in Great Britain) is not
the restrictive factor which it might be here in view of the relatively lax
accounting standards on the continent and, more particularly, the tradi-
tion of showing profits only slightly in excess of dividends.
The statement that depreciation in France is based on original cost,
though perhaps technically correct, is completely incorrect in its impli-
cation because it ignores the application to cost and to past depreciation
charges of a multiple starting at 243 for 1914 and previous years and
descending to 1.05for1958. The operation of this multiple has permitted
additional depreciation to reflect past inadequacies, due to inflation,
on property previously fully depreciated. This has been a very important
factor in permitting self-financing of new investment.
The provision in the French law which permits the balancing charge
(that is, the gain on sale of depreciated assets to the extent of previous
depreciation) to be applied in a very generous fashion to reduce the
basis of newly acquired assets as an option to current taxability also
seems worthy of attention in an analysis of tax influences on investment.
Such technical tax matters as these in the nature of one item in the
direct-tax category seem much more important than debate about the
definition of direct taxation or statistical refinement in the comparison
of direct and indirect taxation.
Indirect taxation also covers a vast range of taxes with quite dissimilar
economic effects, as is immediately apparent if one considers the relative
significance of taxation on alcohol, buildings (with perhaps further atten-
tion to the dissimilar treatment of industrial and residential property
and of new and old buildings), and electric power. The detail seems more
important than the aggregate, or rather the aggregate is almost meaning-
less without the detail.
Here again, what may seem like technical differences may be tre-
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mendously important. I have time to mention only one. The presenta-
tion on the value-added tax does not recognize the two possible ways of
treating the tax component in purchased capital equipment—immediate
deduction, which may wipe out completely the value-added tax due by a
company which is expanding fairly rapidly, and amortization over the
probable life of the equipment. The former method is used in France as
a matter of economic policy. The value-added tax is now being extended
through the retail stage, to take the place of the present 2.75 per cent
tax on retailing, with the expectation that it will encourage investment,
improve efficiency, and reduce cost in distribution.
The alternative method of amortization is, I believe, the one contem-
plated in Germany. It conspicuously fails as an inducement for invest-
ment. In Great Britain the French method is, fortunately, tacitly
assumed to be the method to be used by those discussing the possible
substitution of a value-added tax for the profits tax. The difference in
method of treating the tax included in the price of capital equipment
under this one form of tax seems much more significant than a difference
of even several percentage points in the proportionate yield of direct
and indirect taxation. As a final point, the fact that the value-added
tax can be rebated on exports under its GATT agreements, while
income and profits taxes cannot, seems worthy of recognition in the
discussion of its possible significance for the Tjnited States.
My general conclusion from reflection on the subject of this Confer-
ence is that the traditional distinction between direct and indirect taxa-
tion which I, along with so many others, have made in the past obscures
so many important differences that it may be meaningless and even
misleading. The problem is not primarily a statistical one, however.
We need to examine the nature of the various taxes within these broad
categories and even some rather technical aspects of the specific taxes
to determine their economic significance.
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